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SUMMARY
The unpretentious acronym, “PRSP”, embodies a concept of thorough reform in the poli-
cies of international development. In September 1999, the World Bank and the IMF de-
clared “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers” to be the new fundamental principles for both
their loan policies and the extension of debt relief to highly indebted poor countries
(HIPC II). However, the new policies take much more into account than this. In the
struggle against poverty in low-income countries, national exertions towards development
as well as the donors in development co-operation will be gathered together under one
roof. The PRSP initiative takes up two familiar accusations levelled at international devel-
opment policies. Instead of external interference by an all powerful donor, the principle of
national ownership is to take its place, which shall allow the respective countries to set up
their own development plans. And instead of an imposed development programme, there
are to be the principles of participation whereby the “civil society” and in particular “the
poor” themselves are to assist in the setting up, operation and control of such pro-
grammes.
Inasmuch as the struggle against poverty is declared as the main aim of all develop-
ment activity and, at the same time, the successes in this connection are seen as taking
place within a national framework of democratic and participative self-determination,
two honourable principles in international development policies are united in the new
PRSP approach: the promotion of democracy and the eradication of poverty. While pov-
erty has had its place on social and political development agendas for decades, with the
demands for participation and ownership – following the discussions on “good govern-
ance” since the end of the 1980’s – democratisation has finally found a place in IMF and
World Bank strategy. The following report considers the extent of this conceptual change
and scrutinises the underlying notion of an harmonious integration of perfectly fitting
dimensions of development according to the maxim: “Poverty reduction through democ-
ratisation”.
As a concept, PRSP embraces far-reaching changes and, no less, opens up far-reaching
chances. However, the implementation has shown inconsistencies, contradictions and
limitations which query the concept itself. Thus, the rhetoric of “participation” in PRSP
has so far only been translated into consultation steered by respective governments during
which, more or less, large parts of organised society can put forward their demands. In
addition, parliaments rarely take part in the proceedings. As a result, democratic, repre-
sentative institutions are being replaced by diffuse and non-committal dialogue. At the
same time, macroeconomic policies are generally left aside, despite the fact that these,
following the official announcements, should become the subject of public debate as well.
And all the PRSP policies hitherto – undiluted by “ownership” and “participation” – have
been bent on continuing the well-known, neo-liberal programme schemes. This is secured
from outside by the international financial institutions: conceptually, since only in this
way economic growth can be assured which, for its part, is the conditio sine qua non of
successful poverty reduction; from a practical point of view, since it is the executive
boards of IMF and World Bank which finally decide on the acceptance of a PRSP (and
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therefore on debt relief and further loans). In this way, the continued practice of condi-
tionality systematically limits the extent of participation and ownership and with it demo-
cratic self-determination.
On the other hand, postulates such as participation and ownership as well as emphasis
on the rule of law, competitive politics and democratic elections as a standard frame of
reference certainly create room for activities promoting democracy. Since national gov-
ernments as well as IMF and World Bank will be assessed with regard to the promises of
ownership and participation the PRSP process raises transparency and, in many cases, for
the first time at all allows civil society to engage in decision making on basic social and
political issues in the countries concerned.
The report places the new development strategy embodied by the abbreviation,
“PRSP”, within the double tradition of previous experience in the international promo-
tion of democracy and poverty reduction. From the perspectives of the two democracy-
related elements, ownership and participation, an intermediate account of the PRSP ini-
tiative will be drawn up. This will be in the manner of a desk study and is the result of an
assessment of the lively debate which has unfolded since September, 1999, both within the
development community and among scholars in the field. Evidence will be drawn from
two case analyses, one from Bolivia and one from Tanzania, an exemplary intensification
of matters evolves. Both countries are generally thought of as “strong performers” as far as
the issue of structural adjustment is concerned, have, during the so-called “third wave of
democratisation”, initiated a transition to democracy, and belong to the first participants
in the new initiative. In demonstrating the two cases in point, it is clear how the condi-
tions in each respective country determine the concrete potential of the PRSP initiative.
In Bolivia – where already in the 1990s local participation together with simultaneous
decentralisation had been tested – not only were relatively comprehensive dialogues pos-
sible, but, in the course of the PRSP process, legalised forms of participation and social
control were further extended. This was made possible above all by the presence of well-
organised social groups which insisted on the implementation of PRSP promises from
their own government and the international community. Whereas in the case of the Bo-
livian “success story”, too, there are limits to the PRSP initiative, in the case of Tanzania
these are all the more apparent. It is perhaps significant that democratisation – referred to
in the Bolivian PRSP as an explicit objective of the strategy – in the case of Tanzania does
not play a role at all. The extent of participation in Tanzania was clearly limited and one
cannot (yet) speak here of an institutionalisation of participation at all. At the same time,
both cases reveal the democratic potential, as PRSP processes stimulated dynamics in
society pushing for further changes both in the political system as a whole as well as in the
relationship between the state and society.
How participation is to take place is decided for the most part by national govern-
ments. The IMF and World Bank demand only that – and not how – consultations be
undertaken. Nevertheless, they maintain the right to finally decide upon the acceptance of
PRSP and continue to link debt relief and new loans to concrete conditions, although
these latter have been reduced in number. Financial aid can now hardly be linked solely to
the goals of those receiving it, but requires the acquiescence of the donors. In order to
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show the declared principles of ownership off to its best advantage, the report suggests
that the acceptance of PRSP as the obligatory development strategy be delegated to the
business of annual conferences of the respective donor community. In addition, condi-
tions should focus on implementation and results (ex post) rather than on a diverse range
of concrete measures, and should include clearly demarcated minimum standards for
social participation in setting up PRSP.
What will become of the possibilities opened up by PRSP last but not least depends on
whether the donors – and here we may refer directly to the German Federal Government
– are prepared to adapt themselves in the matter of developmental co-operation. Owner-
ship is not exhausted by strategies set up by national bodies, but demands no less that the
donors integrate their bilateral assistance. For this reason, externally guided projects are to
be replaced by an internally incorporated budget aid. Only in this way can the serious gaps
in financing PRSPs be closed and can the new strategy be expected to yield at least some
results in reducing poverty.
Contents
1. Introduction 1
2. Democracy Promotion and Poverty Reduction in Development
Co-operation 6
2.1. Democracy Promotion– a New Objective 6
2.2. Poverty Eradication – an Old Problem 12
3. PRSP or Reconciling Democracy Promotion and Poverty
Reduction 17
3.1. Integrating Democracy Promotion and
Poverty Reduction – the Theory 19
3.2. Dimensions of Participation and Ownership – the Practice 21
3.3.1. Traces of Participation: Good Governance and Democracy
Promotion 22
3.3.2. Ownership and Participation versus the Continuity of
Economic Blueprint 23
4. PRSP - Bolivia and Tanzania 25
4.1. Bolivia 28
4.1.1. PRSP: Institutionalised Participation and its Budgetary Effects 28
4.1.2. PRSP and Democratisation: a Harmonising Link 31
4.1.3. Participation and Ownership: Bolivian Best Practices? 33
4.2. Tanzania 38
4.2.1. The PRSP: Wish and Reality in Combating Poverty 39
4.2.2. PRSP and Democratisation: a Peripheral Phenomenon 43
4.2.3. Participation and Ownership: Contradictory Interpretations 45
5. Lessons learned? 51
Appendix 58
Bolivia and Tanzania in comparison – Basic Data 58
Abbreviations 59
“Democracy offers the opportunities; it does not offer guarantees of success.”1
1. Introduction
In the year 2000, the United Nations “Millennium Summit” once more confirmed the
traditional, distinguished development objectives of the international community. Ac-
cording to these, the number of people suffering from hunger in the world and those liv-
ing on less than one US dollar a day was to be halved by the year 2015, child mortality
under five reduced by two thirds, maternal mortality by three quarters; the further prolif-
eration of mass epidemics such as AIDS and malaria be stopped, and, moreover, all chil-
dren should be at least guaranteed a primary school education. These objectives were to
be reached by a “global development partnership” which, both nationally and interna-
tionally, was to be manifested by open and fair trade, an adequate financial system and
supported by the principles of good governance, development and the struggle against
poverty.
All this sounds uncomfortably familiar. During the course of the last forty years of
global partnership in development, we have obviously not succeeded in reducing, let
alone eradicating poverty. Be it the “Green Revolution” of the 1960s or the strategy of
furnishing basic needs of the 1970s or the politics of structural adjustment of the 1980s
and 1990s, little has changed in the social and material misery in the former “Third
World”. For this reason, a new beginning is quite appropriate, and yet, in view of the
negative experience so far, the question arises as to what could be done in future which
would be more promising. Eradicating poverty as a “theme dissecting all the political con-
cerns” or as an “all-embracing objective of this readjusted development policy” are de-
claratory goals which in themselves will hardly suffice.2
However, there are not only old objectives, but new beginnings. To these belong the
recognition of the political pre-requisites for successful development which have gained in
importance in the course of Samuel Huntington’s once diagnosed “third wave of democ-
ratisation” and with the end of the East-West conflict. The Federal Ministry for Economic
Co-operation and Development (BMZ) maintains that:
“Development co-operation focuses on the basic conditions in the public and in the societal
spheres of the partner countries in order to lay the ground for a structurally oriented eradi-
cation of poverty. Good Governance, which respects democratic principles and brings about
1 Georg Sørensen, Democracy and Democratisation. Processes and Prospects in a Changing World, Boulder
(Westview Press), 1993, p. 89.
2 BMZ, Auf dem Weg zur Halbierung der Armut – Zwischenbericht 2002. Aktualisierte Kurzfassung zum
Zwischenbericht über den Stand der Umsetzung des Aktionsprogramms 2015, www.bmz.de/aktuell/
armutshalbierung.html (accessed 2003-05-19). All translations of German and Spanish quotations are
the authors’ own.
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encouraging preconditions for economic and social development, is a pre-requisite for
fighting poverty.”3
This diagnosis – which elevates democratisation as a condition for an effective fight
against poverty – is based on the assumption that not only the well-known socio-
economic factors belong to the “primary causes of poverty”, but also the “political and
social exclusion of part of the population and bad governance”. Considered in detail,
these “political poverty issues” include “deficits in political organisation (disproportionate
emphasis on the state sector, excessive state consumption and restrictions of private eco-
nomic activity through production in state-owned factories, over regulation, lack of legal
security and enforceable rights), which result in misallocation of resources to the disad-
vantage of the poor, and poor quality of governance which is grounded in structural defi-
ciencies of the economic system (clientelism, corruption, discrimination, autocracy, lack
of transparency and accountability in the governmental sphere, no control of the govern-
ment via a competitive party system or the separation of powers).”4 The present Secretary
to the United Nations, Kofi Annan, has added to this list by saying: “Good governance is
perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting develop-
ment.”5
These new official development priorities are no less reflected in academic discussions.
Thus Richard Sandbrook paradigmatically states:
“Mass poverty, economic stagnation, and ecological degradation are obviously cause as well
as effect of political disorder. Nevertheless, politics is primary: ‘getting the politics right’ is a
precondition of rising prosperity as well as of the liberty, security, and services for which all
people yearn.”6
And in no way is it owing to a déformation professionelle of democracy research when
Adam Przeworski together with his colleagues asserts: “Poverty breeds poverty and dicta-
torship“ – whereby the circle is completed from the opposite perspective.7
However, the “politicisation of development policies” is not limited to such democra-
tisation postulates with which democracy promotion has become an integral part of de-
velopment aid itself. Moreover it would be badly advised to seize upon another deus ex
machina from the depths which – so much is already clear from the course of the “third
wave” – would only end in further frustration. Rather it is a (self) critical reflection upon
3 BMZ, Verwaltungsreform in der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Ein Positionspapier des
BMZ, BMZ Spezial 046, August 2002, p. 6. On the term “structural poverty”, see also Karl Osner, Struk-
turelle Armutsbekämpfung. Durch selbstverwaltete Institutionen die Politik der Regierungen beeinflus-
sen, in: E+Z, vol. 37, no. 5-6, May-June 1996.
4 BMZ, Verschuldungsprobleme armer Entwicklungsländer. Stellungnahme des Wissenschaftlichen Bei-
rats des BMZ, BMZ Spezial 025, July 2000, p. 21.
5 Quoted from the new strategic document of the US administration “Foreign Aid in the National Inter-
est”, www.usaid.gov (accessed 2003-05-15).
6 Richard Sandbrook, Closing the Circle. Democratisation and Development in Africa, Toronto (Between the
Lines), 2000, p. 1.
7 A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. A Cheibub, F. Limongi, What Makes Democracy Endure?, in: Journal of
Democracy, vol. 7, no. 1, 1996, p. 49.
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the performance, or lack of performance, of orthodox structural adjustment in the past
that accompanied the rediscovery of poverty. This had started earlier and thereby brought
about a number of modifications in detail. However, as long as globalisation was allowed
to continue without restraint in the 1990s, and the vision of a “new economy” not only
encouraged speculative illusions of an endless upward swing on the stock exchange, but
also hopes of a brave new world beyond inflation and recession, the pillars of structural
adjustment and those of the Washington Consensus were not to be shaken. Only when
the Asian crisis sent out its shock waves during 1997-8 and when the “new economy”
proved to be one of a number of short-lived ideologies of economic history, was the way
clear for a fresh, concerted attack on the problem of poverty, armed now with a new
codeword: PRS –Poverty Reduction Strategy.
At first, the change took place at the rhetorical level: at the annual meetings of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in September, 1999, it was decided
to re-name the former “Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility” (ESAF) of the IMF to
“Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility” (PRGF). The same was true for the World Bank
which adopted the term “Poverty Reduction Support Credit” (PRSC) for the former
structural adjustment loans. However, matters did not remain at the rhetorical level since
– and this was the actual innovation – credit within the framework of the PRGF and PRSC
would in future be based on a national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). And in
order to create effective incentives, the extended debt relief for “Highly Indebted Poor
Countries” (HIPC II) was equally attached to the drafting of PRSPs. Thus a new instru-
ment was set up which not only placed relationships between the International Financial
Institutions (IFI) and the approximately eighty eligible developing countries on a new
footing, but was in fact to become a model for donors in general.
 According to the IMF, PRSP stands for a medium-term development strategy “based
on a process involving the active participation of civil society, NGOs, donors, and inter-
national institutions”, whereby “the strategy and the policies should emerge out of na-
tional debates in which the voices of the poor, especially, are heard”. The IFI see them-
selves in this as a service institution to “assist in the process”.8 At the same time, however,
it is the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank who decide on the acceptance of a
PRSP which, in its turn is a condition for debt relief as well as for receiving credit. In con-
crete terms, the countries are required at first to submit an interim PRSP (I-PRSP) on the
basis of which the “Decision Point” of the HIPC II-initiative will be reached so that an
initial debt relief can be facilitated. For the final “Completion Point” of the HIPC-
initiative a full PRSP and progress in its implementation are then necessary. Every two to
8 IMF, The IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). A Fact Sheet, March 2001, www.imf.org,
p. 3. IMF and the World Bank co-operate “by engaging in debates and consultations over policy and by
providing analytical support and technical assistance as requested by national authorities” (ibid.). Civil
society participation in addition to NGOs also refers to trade unions and local-based grassroots organisa-
tions, farmer and indigenous organisations, social as well as religious organisations, cf. Sara Grusky, The
IMF and World Bank Initiate a New Reform Package. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: An Initial
NGO Assessment, Bread for the World Institute Debt & Development Dossier, no. 3, April 2000,
www.jubileeplus.org/analysis/reports/bread010600.htm (accessed 2002-05-16), p. 4.
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five years the strategy is to be reviewed – participation included. In the intervening years,
“PRSP Progress Reports” document the state of the implementation. Assistance from the
IMF and World Bank can already be approved on the basis of I-PRSP and “PRSP Prepa-
ration Status Reports”; after the setting up of a PRSP, the annual “Progress Reports” form
the basis for further loan agreements. Until March, 2003, 24 states had presented a PRSP
(a further 24 an I-PRSP), 14 countries in Africa (14 I-PRSPs), 4 in Latin America (0 I-
PRSPs), 3 in Europe and Central Asia (6 I-PRSPs), 2 countries in Asia (3 I-PRSPs) as well
as one in the Middle East (1 I-PRSP).9
The new strategy is based on two central issues: the introduction and safeguarding of a
democratic system and the consolidation and extension of a market economy. Allegedly,
both work harmoniously together with one another, and both equally are seen as suppor-
tive in fulfilling the requirements of good governance and democratisation, of ownership
and participation, poverty reduction and economic growth, of liberalisation and privati-
sation. Indeed, the PRSP concept is no longer entirely dependent on economic reforms,
but explicitly combines these with the promotion of a policy which on participatory and
self-determinative lines adheres to democratic principles. In the “Poverty Reduction
Strategy Sourcebook” of the World Bank we read that participation requires to be embed-
ded in and supported by democratic structures, in concrete terms by “electoral rules that
mandate regular and fair competition between seekers of political office”, by “the protec-
tion of the law to all citizens – and that can be guaranteed by an independent judiciary”,
by “parliamentary oversight mechanisms such as independent audit institutions” as well
as “access to information, and freedom of the media to investigate and report”. The con-
nection between democracy and the struggle against poverty is equally clear, since:
“Regular, free, and fair elections that can result in changes of government, and the right to
stand for elections are fundamental to empowering the poor.” 10
Although the genuinely “apolitical” IFI in the course of discovering good governance
had opened up to the political dimensions of development as early as the late 1980s, de-
mocratisation as a relevant paradigm did not find footing with the IMF and World Bank
until it appeared in conjunction with PRSP concepts and the promotion of ownership and
participation. However this, too, only occurred indirectly, which raises the issue of its
practical relevance, the more so as conflicts and contradictions cannot be overlooked.
Thus, in line with the limited mandate, “negative” democracy aid which is dependent on
the fulfilment of political conditions, is hardly to be expected by the IFI. The same applies
to “positive” measures. Whether political decentralisation, legal reform, the participation
of civil society or the enforcement of civil and human rights is to be reached via national
strategies in the struggle against poverty will in the end be decided by the national gov-
ernment in question. The same applies to the question as to whether the participation of
9 World Bank, PRSP/I-PRSP/JSA Board Presentations by Region, March 6, 2003, www.worldbank.org
(accessed 2003-03-21); World Bank, Overview of Poverty Reduction Strategies, undated, www.worldbank.
org (accessed 2003-03-21).
10 World Bank, Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook, Draft of April 2001, www.worldbank.org (accessed
2002-05-16), pp. 6, 11.
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civil society during the PRSP process in fact means more than a single consultation of
large NGOs. While it is true that broad-based participation is valid conceptionally as a
conditio sine qua non of new strategies against poverty, the IMF and the World Bank have
not so far followed this up with the presentation of basic standards in the sense of, e.g.,
procedural conditions.11
In all this one is not concerned with procedural questions alone, but with the influence
social groups could have on the shaping of the content of the PRSP. A public discussion of
structural adjustment would indeed have far-reaching democratic consequences and
would, moreover, be a considerable challenge to the IMF and World Bank and their eco-
nomic policies. The very sense of hitherto externally presented structural adjustment
maxims can so easily come into conflict with the essential principles of ownership and
participation – directed towards self-determination –, and this is something which would
seriously affect the harmonious picture of a complementary strategy.12
For a large number of non-governmental organisations it is already evident that the
new political and economic development strategy is concerned with pure ideology, a ver-
dict which, in its radicalism, at least appears somewhat premature. The PRSP concept
with its complementary strategy to promote economic and democratic development in
the interests of the battle against poverty, however, most certainly signals a “potentially
significant change”.13 It is just this potential which is to be examined at close quarters.
Three years after its inauguration, the practical experience is of course still limited, but,
despite this, both in the development community and in scientific circles, a lively debate
has already come into being which at least allows us to make an intermediate assessment.
This will be done as a desk study by citing two illuminating cases, that of Bolivia and that
of Tanzania. Both countries offer themselves as examples, since both have generally been
regarded as “strong performers” in structural adjustment, both have started a transition to
democracy in the course of the so-called “third wave” and both very early on have com-
mitted themselves to the PRSP process. As an illustration to the background of this new
political development strategy, it is nevertheless necessary to refer briefly to the genesis
and essence of the promotion of democracy and the struggle against poverty.
11 “It is for governments to decide whom to consult and how to determine the final content of their strate-
gies. Each country needs to develop its participatory process in the light of its unique circumstances and
find an appropriate balance.” IMF, IMF Lending to Poor Countries – How does the PRGF differ from the
ESAF?, April 2001, www.imf.org (accessed 2003-03-20), p. 3. Explicit condition is only a description of
consultations in the PRSP; cf. IMF, IDA, Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Ap-
proach: Early Experiences with Interim PRSPs and Full PRSPs, March 26, 2002, www.imf.org (accessed
2002-05-16), pp. 21, 26.
12 With regard to “tension between national ownership and policy conditionality”, UNCTAD sceptically
observes: “In effect, the country owns the technical process of policy formulation, but it still lacks the
freedom which would release the creative potential of the approach.” UNCTAD, National development
strategies, the PRSP process and effective poverty reduction, in: UNCTAD, The Least Developed Coun-
tries Report 2002, June 2002, Geneva, www.unctad.org (accessed 2002-10-17).
13 Grusky, op. cit. (note 8), p. 2.
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2. Democracy Promotion and Poverty Reduction in
Development Co-operation
2.1. Democracy Promotion– a New Objective
Democracy promotion can look back on the one hand to a long tradition, but on the
other, as an objective and tool in development policy it is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Not only in Germany it took until the early 1990s that the promotion of democracy and
human rights entered the official agendas for development co-operation in terms of aid
programmes and projects.14 Subsequently to an initial redrafting of the criteria for allo-
cating funds in 1991, the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development
in 1996 laid down five criteria, namely, the respect for human rights, the participation of
the people in political decisions, rule of law, a social market economy and an overall state-
orientation to development, which became distinct spheres of activity in development co-
operation. A similar state of affairs is valid for the European Union which, in 1991, in a
series of EU-guidelines, assigned the promotion of democracy the rank of an “overarching
objective of foreign aid” – with incentives, sanctions and stipulations which were to be
included in all future Union agreements on co-operation. This was then further consoli-
dated when, in November 2000, the European Council and the Commission, acting
against a background of the new, global development priorities, unanimously agreed that
the fight against poverty could only be given promise of success if it were based on a
genuine democracy – thus the promotion of democratic institutions, good governance
and the rule of law ranked among the six major fields of EU development policy.15
It is true that the established democracies operating on the premises that the world
should be made in their own image had prior to this favoured democratic systems in
other countries. There was no question, therefore, in the “African Year”, 1960, for exam-
ple, that they tried to introduce a democratic basis to state independence at the end of
their emphatically undemocratic colonial rule which, however, in most cases proved to be
a short-lived experiment. For two reasons they were able to accept the collapse of many
democratic regimes in the Third World. Modernisation theory which in the 1960s and
into the 1970s guided development co-operation left little room for a genuine promotion
of democracies and the Cold War manifested itself as a utilitarian relationship of the
democratic West to all shades of regimes, including undemocratic ones. Under the pos-
tulate of “freedom”, democracy was primarily seen as a weapon in the ideological struggle
14 Cf. Gero Erdmann, Eine zulässige Einmischung. Demokratie- und Menschenrechtsförderung in der
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, in: E+Z, vol. 41, no. 6, 2000, p. 160; Bernd Eisenblätter, Entwick-
lungspolitik ist Demokratiepolitik, Tagung der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Caddenabia, October 30, 2000.
15 Carlos Santiso, Promoting Democracy by Conditioning Aid? Towards a More Effective EU Development
Assistance, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, no. 3, 2002, pp. 108, 111. Cf. Richard Youngs, The
European Union and the Promotion of Democracy, Oxford (University Press), 2001.
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against real socialism, not, however, as an instrument for undermining despotic regimes
as long as they faithfully served Western interests as in the case of Guatemala, Zaire or
South Korea. Here, elementary, economic, cultural and institutional pre-conditions for
the introduction of democracies were lacking – this was the technocratic modernisation
postulate which managed to transform itself quietly into no less an argument of exculpa-
tion. Initially, economic development had to take place – according to the view of the
times under the firm, guiding and possibly authoritarian hand of so-called “developmen-
tal states” – only then could democracies begin to flourish.
This, however, did not apply to the equally authoritarian states of “socialist orienta-
tion”, especially when this included an alliance with the Soviet Union. These were force-
fully confronted with demands for democracy:
“In the 1950s and 1960s the CIA was the primary U.S. government agency engaged in what
became known as democracy promotion in the 1980s.“16
To these belonged the covert support for political parties, trade unions, student and
women’s organisations – in other words all those bodies which today constitute “civil
society” – plus the electronic and print media. Everything which covertly took place in
those days of the Cold War has, since the 1980s, come out into the open, based on the
unqualified confidence in the universal validity of democratic values. It is an irony of fate
that this change was brought about by the last true Cold War warrior in the person of
America’s president, Ronald Reagan.17 Using a dual strategy of active re-armament and
democratic diversion, he sought to land the socialist regimes where they belonged ac-
cording to his legendary remark – on the rubbish dump of history. And as a testing
ground he selected those countries in the western hemisphere where the challenge was
most obvious and success was most likely, above all in Nicaragua.18
However, that was not enough. Even at that time and especially in the USA, acquies-
cence to the spread of democracies was always accompanied by domestic considerations –
with regard to the legitimisation of an interventionist foreign policy. This was valid at the
time of Ronald Reagan, as former CIA Director, William Colby, freely admitted in the
Washington Post in 1982: “It is not necessary to turn to the covert approach. Many of the
programs which in the late 1950s were conducted as covert operations now are conducted
quite openly, and consequently without controversy.”19 In a similar way, the same is true
16 Elizabeth Cohn, Michael J. Nojeim, Promoting Democracy, in: David W. Deut (ed.), U.S.-Latin Ameri-
can Policymaking – A Reference Handbook, Westport/London, 1995, p. 466.
17 Cf. here Thomas Carothers, Taking Stock of Democracy Assistance, in: Michael Cox, John Ikenburry,
Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), American Democracy Promotion. Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, Oxford (Uni-
versity Press), 2000, pp. 182-186.
18 In the camouflaged language of official development policy, this can be read as: “In countries where
political elites were not committed to democratic reforms, USAID and its partners increasingly worked
to support NGOs whose various advocacy activities help define ‘civil society’ – the political space of citi-
zen participation.” USAID DG Office: History of USAID DG Activities, www.usaid.gov (accessed 2003-
05-19).
19 Quoted after Cohn, Nojeim, op. cit. (note 16), p. 467.
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today where in the case of the recent war on Iraq and in the absence of any convincing
evidence of threat, it was said to serve the noble objective of freeing the country in the
interests of democracy and – as if this were not enough – of freeing the Arab world as a
whole. The only, yet considerable, difference between Reagan and Bush is that, under
Reagan democratisation was valid as an argument to avoid potential military involvement,
whereas today exactly the opposite is true: democratisation as the ideological justification
for military aggression.20
The democratisation postulate was originally not so much motivated by development
considerations as by foreign policy, and gained greatly in momentum when, in the course
of the “third wave of democratisation”, it opened up unexpected new possibilities. De-
mocracy promotion became an important area in foreign and development policy of
western democracies with the expectation that its spread would encourage political and
economic co-operation, allied with the chance of living peacefully together with one an-
other– in accordance with their self-image and in the confidence of a larger capacity to
solve problems characteristic of democracies.21 The former US Deputy Secretary of State,
Strobe Talbott, once disguised this bundle of motives at the climax of democratisation
policy during the Clinton era by saying that the furtherance and safeguarding of democ-
racy in other countries offered a unique chance in “that American values and interests
reinforce each other.”22
The same happened in development policy where in the transition to the 1990s
changes ensued that attributed greater relevance to the political preconditions of devel-
opment. This applied to development theory where the preference for economic devel-
opment, propagated by the classical representatives of modernisation like Seymour Mar-
tin Lipset or Jagdish Bhagwati was progressively questioned, right up to the proposition
that for economic development that of the political realm was of crucial importance. And
it was also true of development assistance where, according to experience with the first
generation of structural adjustment and its purely macro-economic and decidedly anti-
state bias a re-consideration of the role of the state in the development process took place.
20 Cf. on the Reagan era ibid., p. 474: “Through promoting democracy, the United States can take an ac-
tive, long-term role in other countries, without raising potential problems of military entanglements.”
And further: “While direct military intervention and covert operations are viewed negatively by most
U.p. citizens, democracy promotion offers another, more attractive option. [...] Antiinterventionists also
were put on the defensive because they were placed in the position of appearing to oppose democracy.”
21 Cf. here Eberhard Sandschneider, Demokratieförderung von außen, in: Internationale Politik, no. 5,
1997, p. 13; Peter Burnell, Democracy Assistance: Origins and Organizations, in: ibid. (ed.), Democracy
Assistance. International Co-operation for Democratisation, London (Frank Cass), 2000, pp. 34-48.
22 Strobe Talbott, Democracy and the National Interest, in: Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 6, 1996, p. 49. In the
national security strategy of the Clinton Administration this was more comprehensively defined as: “The
core of our strategy is to help democracy and free-markets expand and survive in other places where we
have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a demo-
cratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most.
Thus, we must target our efforts to assist states that assist our strategic interest [...].” The White House
(ed.), A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1996, www.fas.org/
spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.html (accessed 2003-05-20).
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Here, the World Bank and its demand since the end of the 1980s for “good governance”
played a key role. This is understood today officially as:
“We define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is
exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority
are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively man-
age its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state
for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”23
In a purely instrumental sense we are concerned here with “good governance” as a means
above all of dealing with limited resources in an efficient and responsible manner, some-
thing which is best guaranteed under a democratic dispensation. In this sense there is a
close connection with the democratic postulate. Nevertheless, the original addressees are
the state and its capabilities, “civil society” only came upon the scene in the course of the
1990s. Its incorporation became a hallmark of the current World Bank presidency of
James Wolfensohn. Although – or rather because of – the fact that not only the intransi-
gence of governmental recipients, but also the social protests against its associated condi-
tions, questioned the World Bank’s development programme, Wolfensohn consequently
sought specific agreement with unofficial sectors. Thus, we learned at the World Bank’s
meeting in September 1997, that:
“We must listen to stakeholders. Our partnerships must be inclusive – involving [...] labour
organisations, NGOs, foundations and the private sector.”24
In the matter of practical implementation, the World Bank in setting up “Country Assis-
tance Strategies“ no longer exclusively negotiated with respective governments, but con-
sulted civil society representatives as well. And in 1997, with its “Structural Adjustment
Participatory Review Initiative” (SAPRI) the bank for the first time analysed and evalu-
ated the effects of structural adjustment from the point of view of those directly affected
by them.25 In the same year, the World Bank extended its concept of participation by the
component of national ownership: “Development requires much too much sustained
political will to be externally imposed. It cannot be donor-driven.”26 With this the ground
was prepared on which the concepts of participation and ownership could flourish and
finally find a footing in the new Poverty Reduction Strategy in 1999.
There is no doubt about the fact that efforts to allow those directly concerned to have a
say in their affairs and also to allow the secrecies of governmental negotiations on struc-
tural adjustment to be subjected to critical public scrutiny presents a degree of progress.
23 World Bank Institute, Thematic Programs: Governance, www.worldbank.org (accessed 2003-05-15).
24 Quoted from Julie Hearn, Foreign Aid, Democratisation and Civil Society in Africa: a Study of South
Africa, Ghana and Uganda, University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies (Discussion Paper
368), 1999, p. 11.
25 An initiative, however, from which the World Bank then quickly retreated when it discovered that the
results were not sufficiently flattering.
26 Quoted from Christy Thornton, Change and Stagnation in World Bank Poverty Programs, Spring 2002,
Columbia University, New York, www.columbia.edu/cu/cssn/cssa/spr02/thornton-world-bank.html (ac-
cessed 2002-10-30), p. 32.
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Nevertheless, conflicting goals remain. The World Bank and the donors have realised that
the economic reforms propagated by them, painful and controversial though they are,
only have a chance when the body politic and society on the side of the recipients actively
support them. As far as this is concerned, ownership and participation are indispensable
since, “despite its protestations of being ‘apolitical’, the World Bank has a stake in seeing
an enabling political environment for its economic policy”.27 However, the critical spirit
should as far as possible remain within the limits of a higher cognisance of political and
economic understanding which seriously impinges on ownership and participation. Ac-
cording to critical comment, this therefore remains just as procedural as many of the
democratic regimes which have been established in the course of the “third wave”: “[T]he
political imperative of democracy promotion is treated as simply a technical and supple-
mentary element, only mobilised to reinforce the prevailing economic catechism of ex-
port-oriented free markets with little state intervention.”28
Democracy promotion is confronted with a similar dilemma. On the one hand, it has
to create a world which accords with the democratic success stories of the northern
hemisphere. On the other hand, it can be the starting point for democratically legitimate,
yet cataclysmic changes such as that following the first free elections in Algeria which en-
abled Islamic forces to make a breakthrough. In this democracy promotion can be com-
pared with walking a tight rope. Critical voices therefore speak of very limited procedural
objectives at the cost of real participation:
“The immediate purpose of US intervention in national democratisation movements was to
gain influence over and to try to shape their outcomes in such a way as to pre-empt more
radical political change, to preserve the social order and international relations of asymme-
try. Beyond this immediate purpose, the new political intervention is aimed at advancing
the agenda of the transnational elite – consolidation of polyarchic political systems and neo-
liberal restructuring. It seeks to develop technocratic elites and transnational kernels in in-
tervened countries who will advance this agenda through the formal state apparatus and
through the organs of civil society in their respective countries.”29
This is reflected in the promotion of civil society where, traditionally, the USA assumes a
leading role: at least as far as the Clinton era is concerned, 85% of all democracy promot-
ing funds went there, with the objective – limited indeed, but not reprehensible – to open
up political decisions to public debate and to extend the accountability of the political
leadership. In this way, according to an empirical study on Africa, those civil society or-
ganisations which propagated political and economic liberalism received the most sup-
port:
“The most popular civil society actors in terms of democracy assistance were formal, urban-
based, professional, elite advocacy NGOs. [...] Donors are not funding the popular sectors
of society, but are strengthening a new African elite committed to the promotion of a lim-
27 Hearn, op. cit. (note 24), p. 11.
28 Thus, Béatrice Hibou, The World Bank: Missionary Deeds (and misdeeds), in: Peter J. Schraeder (ed.),
Exporting Democracy. Rhetoric vs. Reality, Boulder (Lynne Rienner), 2002, p. 174.
29 Thus William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy. Globalisation, US Intervention, and Hegemony, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996, pp. 318f.
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ited form of procedural democracy and structural-adjustment-type economic policies in
partnership with the West.” 30
Democratisation policies such as these having the limited range of social engineering eas-
ily run the risk of missing their objective, since the social inequalities and economic injus-
tices on which the old regimes rested are simply discounted. But a successful democratic
transformation requires “radical, almost revolutionary change” and more: “The strategic
problem of transition is to get to democracy without being either killed by those who have
arms or starved by those who control productive resources.”31 In contrast to traditionally
practised development co-operation, democracy promotion presents a direct intervention
and so represents a potential danger to those who happen to be in power. This is of course
an immediate threat in the case where opposition parties are receiving support according
to the motto “level the playing field”.32 But it is also valid for the situation where, to all
intents and purposes, neutral activities are being carried, such as the observation of elec-
tions or the participation of civil society – and especially the “poor” – in the domaine re-
servée of governmental decisions.
Another set of problems concerns state capacity and efficiency: How can democracy
and good governance be propagated and realised when the recipients, although adorned
with the symbols of state authority, are in reality suffering from that endemic decay re-
ferred to by the term “state failure”. Many democratisation projects have foundered on a
lack of capacity to absorb for the reason that
“Poor countries need democracy, but the democratic institutions and processes they can
afford are limited, different from those in use in the established industrial democracies, and
probably less than ideal.”33
“Capacity-building” is therefore an essential condition for ownership and participation,
again anything but a technocratic process. However, the support of political parties or of
non-governmental organisations in the past has among the favoured candidates of the
West all too often allowed both a receiver mentality and an expectation of standards to
develop which quite misses all contact with the reality of their social environment. Even
when such organisations for these reasons easily adhere to the political agendas of their
supporters, an uncomfortable consequence remains: hardly are the donors gone and the
more or less artificially imposed structure collapses.
In the last analysis, it is absolutely an open-ended matter after the paradigm change of
the 1980s as to whether democratisation postulate of participation will manage to achieve
the desired effect of creating the “enabling political environment” for economic rational-
30 Hearn, op. cit. (note 24), p. 4. Cf. also Julie Hearn, Mark Robinson, Civil Society and Democracy Assis-
tance in Africa, in: Burnell, op. cit. (note 21), pp. 241-262.
31 Adam Przeworski as quoted in Marina Ottaway, From Political Opening to Democratisation?, in: Ibid.
(ed.), Democracy in Africa. The Hard Road Ahead, Boulder, Col (Lynne Rienner), 1997, p. 2.
32 Sarah E. Mendelson, Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia. Between Success and
Failure, in: International Security, vol. 25, no. 4, 2001, p. 74.
33 Marina Ottaway, Theresa Chung, Toward a New Paradigm, in: Journal of Democracy, vol. 10, no. 4,
1999, p. 100.
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ity in general and the preferred agenda of the World Bank in particular. Bhagwati’s “cruel
choice” between democracy and capital accumulation or Alexander Gerschenkron’s thesis
that a delayed capital intensive growth needs authoritarian state intervention are no
longer fashionable; today one the view prevails that democracy and the free market mutu-
ally reinforce each other. On the other hand, empirical evidence and scholarly theories
are, even today, anything else but definitively clear. Arguing for the idea of complemen-
tary interaction, it is said that political rights to freedom are those which soonest assure
economic productivity, while conflicts are seen in the fact that democracy with its equality
postulate and capitalism with its efficiency postulate are based on entirely different prin-
ciples or that authoritarian systems are much more likely to be in a position to carry
through a reduction in consumption in favour of necessary investments. Consensus does
not reach much beyond the statement that economic development provides a basis for
democracy, whereas the opposite is much less certain. Having said this, little more is ex-
pressed than a relationship in terms of historical epochs which is something hardly suited
to instruct political decisions.34
As a consequence, there remain a series of conflicts and imponderables which question
the success in harmonising democratisation, marketisation and structural adjustment in
the interests of the new strategy to eradicate poverty.
2.2. Poverty Eradication – an Old Problem
The problem of poverty has characterised the discussions on international development
policies ever since World Bank president Robert McNamara proclaimed his basic needs
approach in the 1970s. In the course of political up- and downturns the problem has been
(re) discovered, has been given new names and equipped with new strategies – without,
however, bringing relief for those affected. Now, with the introduction of PRS, the
Washington financial institutions have initiated the newest boom in discussing the prob-
lem of poverty. World Bank official history describes this new impetus as a result of long-
term strategic change:
„In the 1950s and 1960s many viewed large investments in physical capital and infrastruc-
ture as the primary means of development. In the 1970s awareness grew that physical capital
was not enough, and that at least as important were health and education. [...] The 1980s
saw another shift of emphasis following the debt crisis and global recession and the con-
trasting experiences of East Asia and Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Emphasis was placed on improving economic management and allowing greater play for
market forces. World Development Report 1990: Poverty proposed a two-part strategy: pro-
moting labor-intensive growth through economic openness and investment in infrastruc-
ture and providing basic services to poor people in health and education. In the 1990s gov-
34 Cf. Juliet Johnson, In Pursuit of a Prosperous International System, in: Schraeder, op. cit. (note 28),
pp. 32-34, 39.
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ernance and institutions moved toward center stage—as did issues of vulnerability at the lo-
cal and national levels.“35
It is true that in the first two decades after World War II, poverty did not play a role at all.
The theme neither turned up in the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement, nor in its publi-
cations. When US President Truman in 1949 spoke of “grinding poverty” and the need to
combat it – and incidentally, even at that time, through “helping [them] to help them-
selves”,36 and, when in the 1950s the World Bank began to issue “development funds”, it
was primarily a matter of pouring capital into technologically intensive infrastructure
projects in order to promote, in the spirit of modernisation theory, individual develop-
ment projects at strategic points, which would give the necessary boost to a point of de-
velopmental take-off.37 In general, “development” was to be translated as (industrial)
growth; the struggle against poverty needed only to benefit as a result from a “trickle
down” mechanism and needed no separate encouragement.
This situation changed in the 1970s. Following upon World Bank president
McNamara’s strategy of “satisfying basic needs”, the international community discovered
“poverty” as a new theme.38 In 1973, McNamara declared absolute poverty to be a main
target in development policy. At the centre of this policy there was to be concerted inter-
vention in favour of the very poor, especially those in the countryside. Instead of “poor
countries”, one spoke now of “the poor” as individuals. Following criticism of obsession
with growth, which the “Pearson Report” had brought forward in 1969, there was also the
demand for redistribution. “Redistribution With Growth” was the title of a World Bank
publication in 1947, and McNamara’s initiative governed the discussions on development
policies during the 1970s: “By the late 1970s, everyone involved in development was talk-
ing, writing, and structuring policies about poverty issues.”39 Yet, as early as 1978, the
concept of basic needs of the Federal Government in Germany emphasised, as we find it
today, the connection between the struggle against poverty and participation when the
“creation of institutions which will enable the poor to take an active part in the develop-
ment process” is presented as an essential element of national basic needs strategy.40
The 1980s, on the other hand, are characterised by a narrowing of attention primarily
to macro-economic programmes of structural adjustment and macro-economic stabilisa-
35 World Bank, Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000/2001, Oxford (University Press), 2001,
p. 6.
36 Cit. Reinold E. Thiel, Hindernisse bei der Armutsbekämpfung, in: E+Z, vol. 37, no. 5-6, May/June 1996,
p. 131.
37 Cf. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, Ithaca/London (Cornell Univ. Press),
1996, pp. 92-97; Ravi Kanbur, Income Distribution and Development, 1997, www.worldbank.org (ac-
cessed 2002-10-30), p. 3.
38 Cf. Detlef Schwefel, Grundbedürfnisse und Entwicklungspolitik, in: E+Z, vol. 19, no. 6, June, 1978; Paul
P. Streeten, Mabub ul Haq, Grundbedürfnisse und Wachstum: Ein Widerspruch?, in: E+Z, vol. 19, no.
12, December 1978; Finnemore, op. cit. (note 37), pp. 107ff.
39 Finnemore, op. cit. (note 37), p. 97.
40 Das Grundbedürfniskonzept der Bundesregierung, extracts in: E+Z, vol. 19, no. 12, December 1978,
p. 11.
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tion. With the upswing of monetarism and neo-classics in economics whose practical
implementation in development brought about the debt crisis, the eradication of poverty
lost its relevance. The idea of the “trickle down” effect experienced a renaissance – now it
was the turn of the neo-liberal economic reforms that were to lead to growth and social
progress.41 As a prime example, the developmental successes of the Asian “tigers” were
cited as the palpable proof of modernisation theory, and with the dominance of structural
adjustment, the IMF became de facto the central figure of multilateral development policy.
Experience with structural adjustment programmes, however, quickly brought grow-
ing criticism to the fore. In 1987, the UNICEF, in its study, “Adjustment with a Human
Face”, emphasised the grave social repercussions of structural adjustment and sent a re-
minder on social shock absorption. In the same year, Barber Conable, then president of
the World Bank, “re-dedicated [the Bank] to the ‘fight against poverty’”,42 while the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) developed the concept of “human development”. The
“re-discovery” of poverty culminated in 1990 in very similar reports from the World Bank
and UNDP which signalled a move away from the purely market-orientated structural
adjustment policy to one which was more strongly focused on development “with a hu-
man face”.43
The World Bank responded with a dual strategy to the conflict of aims between macro-
economic, liberal reforms on the one side, and poverty-orientated state interventions on
the other, which combined the “classical” poverty reduction concepts, “basic needs”
namely and “helping people to help themselves ”, with a continued emphasis on growth
and so-called “trickle down”. Above all, it became important to make growth labour-
intensive so as to dampen the negative “social costs” of structural adjustment. In concrete
terms, this meant “that only by shifting resources towards more efficient, tradable, pro-
rural, labour-intensive sectors would growth occur and the poor benefit”.44 In the mean-
time, the IMF, too, had declared poverty reduction and equal opportunity as part of its
41 Cf. Stephan Haggard, Markets, Poverty Alleviation, and Income Distribution: An Assessment of Neolib-
eral Claims, in: Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 5, 1991, p. 176 “The development discussion of the 80s
was mainly [...] a debate on the structural adjustment programmes. ‘Liberalisation’, ‘deregulation’, ‘pri-
vatisation’ were the key concepts. According to the wisdom of the manual of Mainstream Economy, the
state should limit itself to guaranteeing inner and outer security and place structural pre-conditions onto
the factor market.” Dirk Messner, Staat und Entwicklung, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Poli-
tik, vol. 40, no. 11, November 1995, p. 1339.
42 Thornton, op. cit. (note 26), p. 27. In the words of official World Bank history records: “External criti-
cism surged after 1985, much of it centred on the austerity of the adjustment effort.” Cit. from ibid.,
p. 26.
43 World Bank, Poverty. World Development Report 1990, Washington, DC (World Bank), 1990; UNDP,
Human Development Report 1990, New York and others (Oxford University Press), 1990. See also Jörg
Goldberg, Allmachtsphantasien der Weltbanker. Bilanz einer Dekade der Armutsbekämpfung, in: Blätter
für deutsche und internationale Politik, vol. 45, no. 1, January 2000, p. 108.
44 World Bank, Poverty Reduction in the 1990s: An Evaluation of Strategy and Performance, 2000,
www.worldbank.org (accessed 2002-10-30), p. 5.
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work within the concept of “high quality growth”.45 In concrete terms, the World Bank
began to carry out participatory poverty assessments in 1993 in order to systematically
highlight the human and social dimensions of development and to place the role of the
poor as principal figures in the foreground. The first link between the subjects of poverty
and democracy began to emerge.
With regard to this renewed focus on poverty, and the largely unabated continuance of
structural adjustment programmes, the World Bank, however, was unable to palliate criti-
cism levelled at the Washington Consensus which kept on undergirding its work. Critics
concentrated on the dualism between economic and social policies since, in the mean-
time, structural adjustment and macro-economic stability were treated as independent
demands framing the concrete poverty programmes: “A dual track policy of economic
and socio-political measures had [developed] which, for the most part stood next to one
another and not infrequently openly contradicted one another: the classical, radical mar-
ket-orientated [...] principles of structural adjustment on the one hand, and the concerted
programmes of poverty reduction on the other. This frequently led to a situation where
nothing worked.”46
The strategies which the World Bank employed as of 1995 to counter the continuing
sharp criticism both from inside and outside indicate the direction later taken by the
PRSP initiative. In this way, the Bank engineered new “partnerships” with NGOs, donor
and recipient countries within the framework of its “strategic compact” initiative. In Feb-
ruary, 1996, the “Participation Sourcebook” appeared along with a comprehensive dis-
cussion of methods for the promotion of participation in development projects, and for
the first time drew attention to the question of “what poverty means to the poor”. This
idea later guided the Bank’s “Voices of the Poor“ study, which became the empirical bases
of the World Development Report for 2000/2001.47 At the same time, World Bank presi-
dent Wolfensohn emphasised a “new paradigm” for development which highlighted the
“social underpinnings” of development and laid stress on a “broader, more integrated
45 Cf. Sanjeev Gupta et al, The IMF and the Poor, in: Raundi Halvorson-Quevedo, Harmut Schneider
(ed.), Waging the Global War on Poverty. Strategies and Case Studies, Paris (OECD), 2000, p. 89.
46 Jörg Goldberg, Front gegen die Armut? Neue Strategien der Bretton-Woods-Institutionen, in: Blätter für
deutsche und internationale Politik, vol. 45, no. 4, April 2000, p. 459. Cf. also Tilmann Elliesen, Welt-
bank-Programme in der Kritik: “Armutsproduktion durch Strukturanpassung”, in: E+Z, vol. 43, no. 7,
July 2002. Even the World Bank itself analyses that reality shows anything but a consistent deployment
of an orientation to poverty, so that it could say in its Evaluation Report for its “Country Assistance
Strategies“ (CAS) in the 90s: “The central focus of all CAS documents is growth. Nearly 80 percent of
those reviewed identified broad-based growth as critical to sustainable poverty reduction, although fewer
than 10 percent made any explicit reference to labour-intensive growth. […] [T]he CAS review found
surprisingly limited differentiation in the policy agenda across CASs […]. Over 90 percent of CASs rec-
ommend a strategy of macro-stability, liberalization, and trade and tariff reform to support broad-based
growth. [...] The implicit assumption seems to be that growth resulting from macroeconomic stability
and improved resource allocation will automatically lead to increased incomes and employment for the
poor and non-poor alike […].” World Bank, Poverty Reduction in the 1990s, op. cit. (note 44), pp. 10f.
47 Within the framework of the ”Voices of the Poor“ Initiative it was attempted in the course of 60,000
interviews to discover what the poor thought of poverty. Cf. Thornton, op. cit. (note 26), p. 34.
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approach”.48 However, it was not only the World Bank which determined the upswing of a
concern with poverty in the 1990s. At the Copenhagen World Summit in 1995, the com-
munity of states declared the global eradication of poverty as an “ethical, social, political
and economic imperative”. With its paper, “Shaping the 21st Century”, the OECD’s De-
velopment Assistance Committee (DAC) a year later brought forward its poverty-
orientated “International Development Goals” onto the agenda. The United Nations de-
clared 1996 to be the “Year of Poverty Eradication”.49 And the bilateral donors, too, in-
creasingly committed themselves to the goal of reducing poverty.50
In January, 1999, Wolfensohn with his ”Comprehensive Development Framework“
(CDF) introduced the conceptual beginnings of the PRSP initiative.51 Following Cord
Jakobeit, the World Bank’s most recent focus on poverty before the introduction of PRSP
possessed four characteristics: a horizontal extension of the strategy (which not only em-
braced the macro-economic framework, but also the political, institutional, human, so-
cial, infrastructural, ecological, and cultural aspects of development); a vertical extension
(geared to all the relevant state and private actors at all levels); a selective concentration
(on development and reform oriented countries); an improved co-ordination and divi-
sion of labour between donors.52
In 2001, a second World Development Report (after the one 1990) explicitly focussed
on poverty in which the World Bank was obliged to admit that certain important meas-
ures had fallen short of their objectives. The report proposed a three-part strategy to pov-
erty reduction by “promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment, and enhancing
security”, an initiative which clearly exceeded the World Bank’s conceptions of poverty
hitherto. Whereas the strategy of the late 1980s and the early 1990s within the framework
of the so-called “dual strategy”, focussed on labour-intensive growth in combination with
programmes for the promotion of human capital, the World Development Report of
2000/2001 not only placed its hopes on improved possibilities for the poor in participat-
ing in economic growth, but, in the sense of a new trinity, also combined this with
empowerment for the poor as well as an improved defence against risk:
“Despite not being an explicit concern of the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement, poverty
alleviation has become the central policy issue for the Bank, now defining its very mission.
Through the redefinition of poverty in the 2000 World Development Report and the re-
structuring of the institutional approach to poverty with the creation of the Poverty Reduc-
48 Quot. ibid., pp. 31f.
49 Cf. Reinold E. Thiel, Armutsbekämpfung – nur ein Rückblick?, in: E+Z, vol. 41, no. 6, June 2000, p. 159.
50 Cf. Aidan Cox, John Healey, Poverty Reduction: A Review of Donor Strategies and Practices, in: Hal-
vorson-Quevedo, Schneider, op. cit. (note 45), pp. 29ff.
51 James D. Wolfensohn, A proposal for a comprehensive development framework, Washington D.C., January
1999. “The explicit purpose of the CDF is the more effective implementation of poverty alleviation pro-
grams though a broadened understanding of the means of development, a more inclusive process of
policy creation, and a greater emphasis on country ownership of policies.“ Thornton, op. cit. (note 26),
p. 33.
52 Cf. Cord Jakobeit, Die Weltbank und “Menschliche Entwicklung”. A new strategic approach from
Washington, in: E+Z, vol. 40, no. 5, May 1999.
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tion Strategy Paper program, the World Bank has experienced what one former Bank
economist [Barend A. De Vries 1996] characterized as ‘an institutional revolution still in
progress’. [...] Emerging from the Bank’s new approach to poverty reduction is a seemingly
revolutionary rhetoric that redefines poverty alleviation to include the promotion of op-
portunity, the facilitation of empowerment, and the enhancement of the security of the
world’s poor. If poverty alleviation is to be central to development strategy, it must, ac-
cording to Bank logic, address the complicated and multifaceted nature of poverty together
with the need for economic growth.”53
This “rhetorical revolution” which, at the latest with PRSP, had also reached the IMF,
must nevertheless be regarded against the background of a distinguished “paradigm
maintenance” (Robert Wade), i.e., a remarkable stability in “meta policy” enforced by the
dominant member states (above all, the USA) as well as by the overwhelming influence of
Anglo-Saxon economists at the World Bank and the IMF. This “meta policy”, according
to Wade, implies that “policies that seem to be inconsistent with neoclassical normative
theory are excluded from the start”.54 It poses the question what weight poverty reduction
will actually carry in its recent boom in multilateral development policy incorporated by
the introduction of PRSP.
3. PRSP or Reconciling Democracy Promotion
and Poverty Reduction
Conceptually speaking, the PRSP initiative undoubtedly constitutes “a fundamental rup-
ture with past practice” of Bretton Woods-Institutions.55 It is not only that development
53 Thornton, op. cit. (note 26), pp. 17f. In the first version of the report, the dimensions “empowerment”
and “security” came before “opportunity”. In the course of its compilation, the report was considerably
weakened, not only at this point, above all by direct intervention by the US government. It was in fact
made compatible with the “classical” objectives of the Washington Consensus; cf. here ibid., pp. 38ff, as
well as Robert Wade, Showdown at the World Bank, in: New Left Review, no. 7, January/February 2001.
That the priority of eradicating poverty is not so clear and controversial after all is shown by the fact that
the co-ordinator of this particular World Development Report, Ravi Kanbur, was dismissed while still at
work on its compilation – because of critical passages on the effects of globalisation on the poor and on
the importance of economic growth for poverty reduction, and this apparently as the result of pressure
from the US Department of Finance; cf. Goldberg, Die Kur ist die Krankheit. Erfahrungen mit Armuts-
bekämpfung nach den Rezepten des Washingtoner Consensus, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale
Politik, vol. 46, no. 9, September 2001, p. 1091, and “Weiterer Rücktritt bei der Weltbank”, in: E+Z, vol.
41, no. 9, September 2000, p. 234.
54 Robert Wade, Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in
Political Perspective, in: New Left Review, no. I/217, May-June 1996, p. 16. Thornton then also com-
plains that: “Because the Bank’s autonomy is checked by the academic, professional and financial power
of the US through the overarching meta-policy, the new language of the WDR [World Development Re-
port 2000] and the new policies of the PRSP program [...] have done little to change the character of de-
velopment policy.“ Thornton, op. cit. (note 26), p. 18.
55 Jean-Pierre Cling, Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubanud, The PRSP Initiative: Old Wine in New
Bottles?, DIAL, Research Unit CIPRE from IRD, September 2002, www.dial.prd.fr/actu_recherche/
PRSPs.pdf (accessed 2002-03-07), p. 2.
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strategies in the future will be obliged to follow the “over-arching” goal of poverty eradi-
cation and operate via participation and national ownership, but that they shall also be
sustainable, and express a democratically based obligation to themselves. In the PRSP
initiative, therefore, the two tendencies of international development policies outlined
above unite. In this, the anchoring of democracy and poverty in policies of the Washing-
ton institutions – if only in the first place programmatically – is without doubt a break-
through since, with the PRSP process, the basic macro-economic orientation and struc-
tural reforms become, nolens volens, the subject of public debate, and it now falls to the
developing countries to develop, in a participative process, the programmes and measures
to reduce poverty.56 If, as a consequence, development strategies are subjected to the nor-
mative goal of poverty eradication and, further exposed, to a broad range of public opin-
ion the established Washington Consensus of orthodox structural adjustment and stabili-
zation will be increasingly questioned.
However, a careful scrutiny of the matter reveals that these far-reaching consequences
have not yet appeared in the application of the PRSP initiative. On the one hand, the
harmonious conception of the triad of poverty reduction, democracy and structural ad-
justment laid down in the documents of the IMF and the World Bank shows that a de-
parture from the Washington Consensus does not enter into consideration. The IFI of
course proceed from the assumption that the neo-liberal prescriptions are very much in
the interest of poverty reduction and that therefore a democratic decision-making process
can only lead to their confirmation. On the other hand, in the implementation of PRSP
initiatives, clear lines of demarcation are drawn limiting both ownership and participa-
tion. In the national framework, it is the government which assumes the dominant role in
setting up the PRSP, whereas internationally it is the World Bank and IMF which consti-
tute the last instance in accepting the paper and, by this way, decide upon debt relief and
further loans. It is therefore not surprising when practically all analyses come to the con-
clusion that the extension of participation and ownership via PRSP had virtually no influ-
ence on the basic policy orientation of the donor institutions.57
This area of tension involving claim, reality and possibility will be dealt with in greater
detail whereby the central theme of the report – the relationship between democratisation
and the struggle against poverty occupies a prominent place. The basis for this are the
relevant PRSP documents from World Bank and IMF as well as scientific analyses and
critical assessments of the PRSP initiative as conducted by the international development
56 Cf. IMF, The IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). A Fact Sheet, March 2001,
www.imf.org (accessed 2002-05-16), p. 2.
57 This has been confirmed by the IMF and World Bank: “National poverty reduction strategies recognize
that sound growth requires investment, not least in human capital and infrastructure, as well as the right
macroeconomic and structural policies, good governance, and healthy institutions. Countries are seek-
ing to build an improved investment climate, to compete in world markets, and to foster development
that is less dependent upon official financing in the long-term.” IMF, IDA, Review of the Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach, Main Findings, March 15, 2002, www.imf.org (accessed 2002-05-
16), pp. 2f.
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community.58 At the core of these considerations is the question of how far the PRSP ini-
tiative embraces the objective of a structurally oriented struggle against poverty based on
democratic procedures and participation processes, and to what extent economic pro-
grammes in the interest of poverty reduction will be subjected to social participation and
national ownership.
3.1. Integrating Democracy Promotion and Poverty Reduction – the Theory
IMF and World Bank express a twofold expectation with regard to participation. On the
one hand, it is to ”deliver a sense of broad-based ownership, not only by government but
by civil and political society at large”. On the other, it is to ”strengthen democratic gov-
ernance and accountability in countries where poverty is related to weak government
accountability and the disenfranchisement of large sectors of the population.”59 The two
slogans, “participation” and “ownership” – along with poverty eradication as first priority
– comprise the central principle of the PRSP approach. “Ownership” stands for the na-
tional responsibility for the strategy; “participation” refers to the political and social forces
in cognising this responsibility. Both mutually condition each other. Since “country own-
ership” not only refers to the government, this therefore insinuates the participation of
society. Conversely, participation remains a thing which is null and void at the level of
58 The evaluation is based on the following PRSP analyses: Rosemary McGee, Assessing participation in
poverty reduction strategy papers: a desk-based synthesis of experience in sub-Saharan Africa, IDS Research
Report, no. 52, February 2002, Brighton, Sussex, www.ids.ac.uk (accessed 2002-08-15); Rosemary
McGee, Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategies: A Synthesis of Experience with Participatory Ap-
proaches to Policy Design, Implementation and Monitoring, IDS Working Paper, no. 109, 2000, Brighton,
Sussex, www.ids.ac.uk (accessed 2002-06-13); Cling, Razafindrakoto, Roubanud, op. cit. (note 55);
Walter Eberlei, Thomas Siebold, Armutsbekämpfung in Afrika: Neue Ansätze oder alte Konzepte?, Duis-
burg (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, INEF-Report, no. 64) 2002; Charles Abugre, Still Sapping
the Poor: A Critique of IMF Poverty Reduction Strategies, June 2000 (Updated February 2001), in: World
Development Movement, www.wdm.org.uk (accessed 2002-05-23); Grusky, op. cit. (note 8); Miriam
Walther, Armutsstrategiepapiere (PRSP). Neuanfang in der Strukturanpassungspolitik von IMF und Welt-
bank?, WEED Arbeitspapier, Bonn, Mai 2002; UNCTAD (ed.), Economic Development in Africa. From
Adjustment to Poverty Reduction: What is New?, New York/ Geneva (United Nations), 2002; European
Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD), PRSP – The Story So Far..., September 2001,
http://bicusa.org/ptoc/htm/endd_prsp2001.htm (accessed 2002-08-15); Overseas Development Institute
(ODI) (ed.), PRSP: Institutionalisation Study: Final Report, Chapter 1: Overview of PRSP processes and
monitoring, submitted to the Strategic Partnership with Africa, October 15, 2001, www.odi.org.uk (ac-
cessed 2002-08-22). Irene Knoke, Pedro Morazan, PRSP: Beyond the Theory, Practical Experiences and
Positions of Involved Civil Society Organisations, “Brot für die Welt”, May 2002, www.eurodad.org (ac-
cessed 2002-08-15); OXFAM, Influencing Poverty Reduction Strategies: A Guide, Oxfam Policy Papers,
March 2002, www.oxfam.org.uk (accessed 2002-05-16); World Development Movement (ed.), Policies to
Roll-back the State and Privatise? Debt-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. A debt policy report, April 2001,
www.wdm.org.uk (accessed 2002-05-16); Jubilee South, Focus on the Global South et al (eds.), The
World Bank and the PRSP: Flawed Thinking and Failing Experiences, Ottawa, November 16, 2001,
www.focusweb.org (accessed 2002-05-16); Jubilee South, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Structural
Adjustment Programmes in Disguise, Jubilee South Pan-African Declaration on PRSPs, Kampala, May 10-
12, 2001, http://aidc.org.za/sapsn/declaration/kampala.html (accessed 2002-05-16).
59 McGee, Assessing participation ..., op. cit. (note 58), p. 4.
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political decision making if this is dominated from the outside.60 Having said this, we may
not overlook that despite the emphasis on broad participation and national ownership the
PRSP process is, even in its design, quite clearly executed by the government: “While the
PRSP process is ‘country-owned’, it is clearly ‘government-led.’”61
Basically, ownership and participation in the development discourse occupy a dual
function. On the one hand they appear as necessary in order to produce poverty reduction
and growth strategies that are appropriate to specific conditions. On the other hand, own-
ership and participation are considered necessary from the point of view of pure effi-
ciency, since experience shows that development projects and programmes without the
acceptance of the “target groups” are bound to failure. The second appreciation seems to
be the dominant one as far as the IFI go, as here it is less a matter of the participative
choice of a way than of the resolve in pursuing a chosen way In another context, the
World Bank has formulated it as follows:
“It must be remembered that the goal is not partnership per se. Partnership is a means to an
end. The real goal is the shared objective. Partnership is a tool to reach this goal more effec-
tively, and more efficiently, for the benefit of all involved.“62
The purely instrumental appreciation of participation and ownership could not be ex-
pressed more succinctly, something, too, which also shows up in the PRSP concept in that
participation is demanded but, at the same time, systematically limited. When the ”shared
objective” and respective strategies are supposed to be known, the PRSP process as a
consequence adjusts itself above all to the forms and less to the content.63 This, however, is
only plausible in conditions of homogeneity within “civil society” and if participation is
essentially conceived as an “undertaking embracing partnership”.64 Yet, transformation
strategies, such as the PRSP claims to be, have a very limited range when they choose to
ignore social inequalities entailing development barriers and potential for conflict. For
this reason it is small wonder that right from the start the IFI have had to spend much
effort in order to guide the PRSP process into the preferred channels. This is clearly dem-
onstrated by the PRSP contents and preparation processes.
60 Cf. McGee, Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategies, op. cit. (note 58), p. 8.
61 IMF, IMF Lending to Poor Countries..., op. cit. (note 11), p. 3.
62 World Bank, Partnership for development: proposed actions for the World Bank. A discussion paper, 1998,
p. 5.
63 Here, there is no doubt when the IMF remarks on PRGF: “The core aim of the PRGF is to arrive at
policies that are more clearly focused on economic growth and poverty reduction and, as a result of bet-
ter national ownership, more consistently implemented.” IMF, IMF Lending to Poor Countries..., op. cit.
(note 11), p. 1.
64 Ann-Kathrin Schneider, Die Weltbank in der Wolfensohn-Epoche: Armutsbekämpfung zwischen
Rhetorik und Reformversagen, WEED (ed.), Informationsbrief Weltwirtschaft & Entwicklung, Sonderdi-
enst no. 7, December 2002, p. 3.
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3.2. Dimensions of Participation and Ownership – the Practice
Essentially, there are four forms of participation: participation through information,
consultation, common decision and the initiation and control by the stakeholders.65
Within the framework of PRSP, participation has so far limited itself to the consultation
type. This is plausible enough, because according to classical democratic theory, the par-
ticipation of non-representative social groups in political decision-making may not exceed
the bounds of consultation. Notwithstanding, this kind of participation can vary appre-
ciably in depth and scale, as demonstrated by PRSP processes in different countries. Since
IMF and World Bank do not set out basic procedural standards, the form of consultation
is determined primarily by specific national circumstances – even when the IFI, respond-
ing to social demands, have intervened here and there to directly influence the procedural
course of consultations.66
In their first evaluation in 2002, the IFI have confirmed that the PRSP approach has
contributed to ”openness and transparency and broad-based participation.”67 Independ-
ent studies, too, have found evidence for a furtherance of social participation and indeed a
growth of transparency during the course of the PRSP processes. In effect, this has meant
a larger participation in the discussion of poverty as well as better access to political deci-
sion-making. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that the quality of participation
from country to country differs greatly, and throughout requires improvement. There is
considerable criticism of the fact that there was an inadequate participation of “the poor”,
of “women”, of trade unions and of parliament. A consistent characteristic was the disre-
gard of parliamentary participation and control. Within the executive, the PRSP process
in the main led to the strengthening of the so-called “key ministries” (for Finance and
Economy). In addition, the desired institutionalisation of participation remained – thus
the IMF and World Bank – hardly a fulfilled challenge.68
Criticism also pointed to time pressure that proved to be a burden to participation
when elaborating the first generation of PRSPs. This was derived from the linking of
HIPC debt relief and the PRSP initiative. Whereas debt relief is badly needed as quickly as
possible, national processes of consultation and dialogue take their time. In view of this,
an impression was gained that “civil society participation was stifled in a tight corset.”69
65 Cf. McGee, Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategies, op. cit. (note 58), p. 14.
66 Cf. Grusky, op. cit. (note 8), p. 5.
67 IMF, IDA, Review of the PRSP Approach: Early Experiences..., op. cit. (note 11), p. 21.
68 Cf. IMF, IDA, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Progress in Implementation, September 11, 2002,
www.worldbank.org (accessed 2002-10-30), p. 15.
69 Barbara Unmüßig, Jubilee 2000: Kleine Bilanz einer großen Bewegung, www.weedbonn.org/finance/ jubi-
lee2000.htm (accessed 2002-05-23), p. 3. The IFI also confirm this; cf. IMF, IDA, Review of the PRSP Ap-
proach: Early Experiences…, op. cit. (note 11), p. 20; Horst Köhler, James D. Wolfensohn, Memorandum.
Fighting Poverty and Strengthening Growth in Low-Income Countries, April 20, 2001, www.imf.org (ac-
cessed 2002-05-16), p. 3.
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In contrast to participation whose forms and extent can be empirically evaluated, own-
ership is something which requires a high degree of interpretation. Both the IMF and the
World Bank are of the opinion that there is a “growing sense of ownership among most
governments of their poverty reduction strategies.”70 In her very critical analysis of the
PRSP initiative, Rosemary McGee notes that it indeed places more value on ownership
than all other programmes hitherto.71 Despite this, there are clear limits. The ODI, apro-
pos of this, notes in a comprehensive study that from the point of view of domestic poli-
tics, ownership exists for the most part in the “technocratic” dimension, and does not
extend very much further than the ministries responsible for economic policy.72 As far as
foreign relations are concerned, there are numerous studies which refer to the continued
powerful influence of the IMF and the World Bank, above all regarding the macro-
economic frameworks of the respective PRS. These limitations, however, can only be
properly assessed by evaluating as to what extent the transfer of responsibility in the
drafting of PRSP to the national level influences the substance of the new poverty reduc-
tion strategies.
3.3.1. Traces of Participation: Good Governance and Democracy Promotion
As far as the subject of good governance is concerned, the IMF and World Bank have
noted a distinctly identifiable, positive effect of the participation processes since, in many
instances the conduct of governments had thereby found its way into the poverty reduc-
tion strategies.73 There are, however, many distinct differences from one country to an-
other. While in a few cases the substantial improvement of governance has been elevated
to a central dimension of the PRSP, the theme of corruption stands starkly to the fore.
This certainly corresponds to the preferences of the Washington institutions which have
placed particular emphasis on the latter. The issue of decentralisation has been equally
raised which is plausible from the point of view of welfare provisions but quickly collides
with the highly restricted resources of the lower levels of state apparatus. Participation, as
far as this is concerned, also means control of local representatives and has awakened de-
mands on institutionalised participation, a matter which has been touched upon in a
number of PRSPs but has hardly been implemented. Altogether, the demanded reforms
are inspired by a narrowly defined, technocratic view of good governance.74
70 IMF, IDA, Review of the PRSP Approach: Early Experiences..., op. cit. (note 11), p. 5.
71 McGee, Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategies, op. cit. (note 58), p 21.
72 ODI, PRSP: Institutionalisation Study, op. cit. (note 58), p. 55.
73 IMF, IDA, Review of the PRSP Approach: Early Experiences..., op. cit. (note 11), p. 56. Cf. also IMF, IDA,
Background Information to the Joint IMF/World Bank Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Ap-
proach, March 26, 2002, www.imf.org (accessed 2002-05-16), p. 5.
74 “Good governance is necessary to assure sound management of public resources, and achieve greater
transparency, including active public scrutiny and government accountability in fiscal management.”
IMF, IDA, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Operational Issues, December 10, 1999, www.imf.org (ac-
cessed 2002-05-16), p. 3.
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While the IFI discerned a significant influence on the part of “civil society” with regard
to governance issues in PRSPs, the conclusions drawn by the NGOs are much more am-
bivalent. A typical assessment here is that the participation of social groups in the prepa-
ration of PRSPs has “probably contributed to the emancipation and articulation of civil
society in every country”, whereas the concrete opportunities of influencing the content,
objectives and strategies of PRSPs ought to be “ranked as disappointing”.75 Similarly, a
French study stresses above all the potential of PRSP participation as “a motor for
strengthening civil society”.76 Consequently, it is primarily the indirect effects – in terms of
political empowerment – which are positively registered, and attributed to the attractions
which the PRSP process offers. However, direct influence on official political issues is
regarded as marginal, especially where this concerns basic economic decisions.
3.3.2. Ownership and Participation versus the Continuity of Economic Blueprint
In one result all analyses of the PRSP initiative are unanimous: On the central issue of
structural adjustment and the policies of macro-economic stabilisation there is unequivo-
cal continuity – and this despite the fact that “in all HIPC countries a strong, social front
has formed against an orthodox, neo-liberal adjustment policy”.77 Thus, the orthodoxy of
keeping inflation low runs through all PRSPs.78 Strict limitations of budget deficits as well
as the liberalisation of foreign trade and the banking system are uncompromised stipula-
tions which are seen as essential preconditions for reducing poverty. Here, ownership and
participation have left no traces in their drive to overcome: “one size fits all”.79
PRSP similarities to earlier “Policy Framework Papers” and the relationship between
PRSPs and parallel IMF agreements under the new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facil-
ity (PRGF) reveal no less the continuity of neo-liberalism. Although the IMF insists that
the latter is based on priorities of the PRSP, experience indicates that the opposite is the
case, whereby the PRGF credit agreements stake out the macro-economic frame wherein
the PRSP may operate. Moreover, current IMF agreements within the framework of ESAF
were simply re-named as PRGF agreements in a number of cases and notably in Bolivia.
Although the “streamlining” of IMF conditionality reduced the number of conditions and
tailored their content to the “core competencies” of IMF and World Bank, the leeway in
75 Gabriele Müller, Frühjahrstagung von IMF und Weltbank. Die HIPC-Schuldeninitiative nach zwei Jahren –
die Euphorie ist verflogen, 2001, www.weedbonn.org (accessed 2002-05-23), pp. 4f.
76 Cling, Razafindrakoto, Roubanud, op. cit. (note 55), p. 11. The authors also assess the PRSP initiative as
“great potential for strengthening democracy” (p. 3).
77 Müller, op. cit. (note 75), p. 6.
78 Even in countries with an inflation rate of 3-5% (e.g. Mauritania, Niger und Uganda), the fight against
inflation remains on the PRSP agenda as a main monetary objective; cf. UNCTAD, Economic Develop-
ment in Africa, op. cit. (note 58), p. 24.
79 For very different countries such as Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Tanzania, and Uganda, a WEED-
Study has precisely this to say: “It is noticeable how similar the five Strategy Papers are – and this despite
the differentiated country contexts and the varying courses of participation processes.” Walther, op. cit.
(note 58), p. 7.
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making decisions on economic issues in the countries concerned has not increased. Critics
even complain that, as a consequence of linking HIPC debt relief to PRSP acceptance, the
role of the IMF and the World Bank’s executive boards may have been further strength-
ened.
As a rule and contrary to official proclamations, macro-economic issues and structural
adjustment are not subject to national ownership and social participation in PRS imple-
mentation. Not only does IFI acceptance of a PRSP remain conditional on the observance
of the traditional macro-economic objectives, but open debate on these issues during the
consultation process is, for the most part, also excluded. It sounds therefore bigoted when
the IMF and World Bank find fault in declaring that the political dialogue should be
deepened in many respects “including the design of macro-economic frameworks under-
pinning PRSPs, the development of alternative scenarios and policy reform options.”80
Participation and ownership appear to be firmly limited to the social area – and for that
reason to the compensatory back-up of conventional IMF programmes by poverty reduc-
tion measures.81
In principle, the PRSP approach has added two, explicitly poverty oriented elements to
the conventional stabilisation and structural adjustment policies. For one, the realisation
that economic growth does not always “trickle down” to automatically reducing poverty
calls for “policies that facilitate the access of the poor to human, physical and financial
assets to improve their earning capacity”. Secondly, temporary negative effects of eco-
nomic reforms require “that such policies should be accompanied by safety nets and tar-
geted spending programmes”.82 In concrete terms, anti-poverty measures in PRSPs in-
clude the extension of basic health and basic education:
“Other areas – such as monetary and exchange rate policies, the trade regime or budget
management, which are also relevant to poverty – are excluded, apparently with the ap-
proval of the IFI, and are the domain of the Fund negotiating directly with the respective
governments. In this way, the PRSPs are mainly intent on expenditure programmes and
here on social services and infrastructure. The areas of health and education are most
prominent; they are frequently the smallest common denominator in the political process,
and can be easily ‘sold’ to the donors. Yet, the directly productive, employment-producing
sectors are neglected.” 83
80 IMF, IDA, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Progress in Implementation, op. cit. (note 68), p. 5.
81 John Sender concludes in the same manner that the new poverty-orientation of World Bank means no
break with the principles of the Washington Consensus, but that the social recommendations are merely
“thin gloss superimposed on a fundamental adherence to the tents of the neoliberal faith”; John Sender,
Reassessing the Role of the World Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: Jonathan R. Pincus, Jeffrey A. Winters
(ed.), Reinventing the World Bank, Ithaca/London (Cornell University Press), 2002, p. 198.
82 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa, op. cit. (note 58), p. 4.
83 Eberlei, Siebold, op. cit. (note 58), p. 48. Jubilee South et al make the criticism that in the PRSPs the
necessary elements are lacking for the struggle against poverty such as “land and agrarian reform, pro-
gressive taxation, support for domestic markets and protection, food sovereignty, the protection of envi-
ronment and labour vis-à-vis investors, assurances of social rights and entitlements, and other forms of
governmental protection vis-à-vis the free market”. Jubilee South, Focus on the Global South et al, op.
cit. (note 58), p. 2.
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Despite conceptual flexibility, the continuity of economic orthodoxy unmistakably con-
stitutes valid terms of reference of concrete strategies against poverty. If one is to take the
declared links between poverty reduction, participation and ownership seriously, nation-
ally organised processes would be open to social deliberation and would accordingly have
to combine the poverty-reducing objectives with appropriate macro-economic policies
and structural reforms. However, the integration of poverty reduction and structural ad-
justment – thus the (mostly implicit) premises of the IMF and World Bank – is thought to
take place without receiving essential modification of the latter. And this is not changed
either by such metaphors as “pro-poor growth” as these are by no means filled with sub-
stance in the PRSP design.84 While it is hardly a matter of contention that economic
growth is an essential pre-condition for progress in the struggle against poverty, it is far
more unconvincing that growth should be conditionally associated with the well known
neo-liberal prescriptions.85 This association implies reversing priorities: Whereas the PRSP
concept originally defined poverty reduction as the main goal and structural reform
merely as a means to this end, now these economic reforms appear to be pre-conditions
for economic growth and, thus, for the reduction of poverty.
4. PRSP - Bolivia and Tanzania
Not only in structural adjustment, but also in the PRSP process, both Bolivia and Tanza-
nia are generally considered “strong performers” – at least as far as speed goes. Already at
the beginning of the year 2000, both presented their interim PRSP and a few months later,
their PRSP, and both achieved in 2002 the “Completion Point” upon which they were
awarded full HIPC II debt relief. We have therefore chosen two cases which, from the
point of view of the IMF and World Bank, belong to the most successful examples of the
initiative. Comparative observations on the two countries at the same time reveal in detail
the opportunities and limitations, the potential and contradictions as well as inconsisten-
cies with which the PRSP concept is associated. This is equally true for the visible differ-
ences between both countries as for their similarly visible common features.
The question of participation and democracy, reveals particularly marked differences.
A case in point is that there is hardly any weight given to democratisation in the Tanza-
84 Cf. Eberlei, Siebold, op. cit. (note 58), p. 46. In the World Bank’s PRSP Sourcebook the intended chapter
on pro-poor growth remained the only one unwritten and does no longer exist in the latest version; cf.
ibid., p. 47; World Bank, Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook, op. cit. (note 10). IMF and World Bank
openly admit that the understanding of the term “pro-poor growth” urgently requires dilation; cf. IMF,
IDA, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Progress in Implementation, op. cit. (note 68), p. 17.
85 IMF and World Bank emphasise: “Rapid, sustainable growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduc-
tion, along with a pattern of growth in which the poor fully participate. This will require prudent macro-
economic management, robust private sector activity and investment, and sound sectoral and structural
policies.” IMF, IDA, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Operational Issues, op. cit. (note 74), p. 3.
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nian PRSP, whereas this plays a central role in the Bolivian strategy. Above all, Bolivia’s
participatory process is often put forward as an exemplary case, building upon other,
foregoing initiatives. This is true, for example, for the local institutions of people’s par-
ticipation (“social control”) with which, within the framework of the “Second Generation
of Reform” after 1993, the orthodox structural adjustment was extended to a programme
of comprehensive, social modernisation and complemented by projects for decentralisa-
tion and popular participation (participación popular).86 Added to this, the government
under Hugo Banzer immediately after its election initiated a national dialogue in October,
1997. During a twelve-day series of discussions, political parties, trade unions, churches
and NGOs were able to voice their demands and ideas, a dialogue which led to the devel-
opment of a plan to combat poverty. After all, there are well-organised social groups in
Bolivia – especially surrounding the Catholic Church –, which are close to the consensus
orientated PRSP initiative and therefore urged their government and donors to turn the
official promise of active participation into reality. This not only facilitated a relatively
comprehensive dialogue, but in the course of the PRSP process, the possibilities for par-
ticipation and social control were further extended, institutionalised and legally consoli-
dated.
In Tanzania, on the other hand, these link-ups were only existent in a rudimentary
form with the result that participation took on a quite different form. Nevertheless, the
Tanzanian strategy – as the Bolivian – advanced the ideas of decentralisation and partici-
pation as well: The local administrations became the focal point in combating poverty,
and here influence and control of “the poor” are to materialise. Even with regard to in-
stitutionalising social participation, first initiatives occurred. The PRSP initiative in Tan-
zania remains above all a potential for the promotion of democracy whose further devel-
opment very definitely depends on complex social dynamics. However, this is also basi-
cally true for Bolivia, where we (still) cannot speak of a participation in which “the poor”
are truly involved and which seriously addresses matters of social conflict. In the same
terms, both countries have confirmed the general observation that the parliaments have
only played a marginal role in the PRSP process. Yet diffuse and almost by definition se-
lective social participation requires embeddedment in representative structures.
While the design and the dynamics of the participation process is distinguished by na-
tional characteristics, the content of PRSPs shows much more similarities. Although in
both countries there is widespread criticism of the Washington Consensus, these political
and economic controversies left no traces within the PRSP framework. The organisations,
86 Cf. Albert von Gleich, Poverty Reduction Strategies – the Experience of Bolivia, HWWA Report, no. 178,
1998, Hamburg, p. 12; Hans J. Petersen, Die wirtschaftliche Reformpolitik der Regierung Sánchez de Lo-
zada, in: Lateinamerika. Analysen-Daten-Dokumentation, vol. 13, no. 31, 1996, pp. 52f; Ulrich
Goedeking, Bolivien: Die ersten 100 Tage der Regierung Banzer, in: Lateinamerika. Analysen-Daten-
Dokumentation, vol. 15, no. 37, February 1998, p. 18. While decentralisation led to the redistribution of
resources from central government budget to local governments, the participación popular created
mechanisms of social control at local political level; cf. Rodolfo Mercado, Dezentralisierung und Par-
ticipación Popular, in: Lateinamerika. Analysen-Daten-Dokumentation, vol. 13, no. 31, 1996.
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for instance, which have been invited to participate in the drafting of the Tanzanian PRSP
stressed the negative balance which has arisen since the 1980s via structural adjustment:
“Fifteen years of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) have not improved the quality of
life for Tanzanian citizens. The IMF and the World Bank have financed structural adjust-
ment policies in Tanzania for about 15 years. Per capita income and basic human welfare
indicators have fallen during this time period. For example, per capita GDP has fallen to the
1960 level and primary school enrolment rates plunged below 50 percent from an average of
80 percent during the 1980s.”87
In Bolivia, too, there was widespread criticism of “neo-liberalism” which could not be
ignored and yet, despite this, both PRSPs rely completely upon economic continuity. Only
in this way, the argument goes, is the prime condition for the reduction of poverty – eco-
nomic growth – achievable. Relations between growth and poverty therefore remain a
purely rhetorical consideration, and so the dualism between structural adjustment and the
eradication of poverty untouched. Both strategies are based on economic growth by con-
tinuing the conventional policies of reform without, however, filling out the frequently
reiterated metaphor of “pro-poor growth” with substance.
If the macro-economic framework is not opened up for discussion, then participation
collides with its own standards, and the claim to national ownership will be questioned. It
thus must still be proved whether the dynamics of the PRSP process can in the long run
contribute to the extension of the ideas of participation and ownership, thereby over-
coming its limitations as development strategy. Up to now it has served in Tanzania as in
Bolivia mainly as a framework for the poverty oriented use of the “new” financial funds
from debt relief. Here we can recognise first successes, since the expenditures in favour of
PRSP priority sectors such as basic education, basic health and rural development have
considerably increased. In Bolivia, moreover, innovative steps were taken to set up an
institutionalised body to distribute these monies. However, PRSP is intent to embrace far
more than the mildly participatory erection of an externally financed poverty programme.
As the regularly escalating social disputes in Bolivia demonstrate, the PRSP process in
its present form is not in a position to measure up to the claims of the initiative. Without
an opening of participation to broader societal groups and demands, and without an-
choring the processes in the representative democratic structures, as deficient as these may
be, national ownership is hardly reachable. However, this change is not ruled out on prin-
cipal grounds and is promoted by non-governmental actors on national and international
level, but as yet it awaits consistent implementation as the two cases, Tanzania and Bo-
livia, make clear.
87 “Year 2000 Country Profile: The Status of Tanzania with the IMF and World Bank”, in: Globalisation
Challenge Initiative (ed.), Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) Information Alert Series, no. 2, Novem-
ber 22, 2000, p. 3.
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4.1. Bolivia
Regarding the relationship between structural adjustment, poverty reduction and democ-
ratisation, Bolivia has paradigmatic significance. In the first place, it has, since its first
stabilisation and structural adjustment programme in 1985, enjoyed the position of being
an exemplary case in consistent reform policy. However, after almost twenty years of neo-
liberal reforms, Bolivia remains – with an average income of less than 1000 US dollars a
year per head – one of the poorest and most heavily in-debted countries in South Amer-
ica. About two thirds of the population live below the national poverty line, and social
inequality went up further in the 1990s. At the time of writing, the country is recorded as
having the sixth highest level of income inequality worldwide.88 This ambivalent position
of being a “poster child” of the international development community and at the same
time the “poor house” of South America constitutes Bolivia’s high dependence on devel-
opment aid, a fact which underlines the importance of the PRSP initiative. The amount of
official development assistance to Bolivia runs to 10% of the GDP, that is 50% of public
investment.89 From the point of view of the relationship between democracy and struc-
tural adjustment, it is also of interest to note that all economic reforms were undertaken
by an uninterrupted series of democratic governments.
4.1.1. PRSP: Institutionalised Participation and its Budgetary Effects
Only a few months after the introduction of PRSP and HIPC II, Bolivia presented its in-
terim PRSP in January 2000 with which it reached the debt relief initiative’s “Decision
Point”. After a renewed and now explicitly PRSP-adjusted National Dialogue (Diálogo
Nacional 2000), the PRSP finalised at the beginning of 2001. In June, 2001, Bolivia
reached the “Completion Point”, only second to Uganda. For public finances, HIPC II
means a further nominal reduction of debt to the tune of 1.3 billion US dollars where
total HIPC debt relief, according to IMF figures, runs at about 2 billion US dollars. The
official and officially-guaranteed debt thus will be reduced from 213% of exports (1998),
to 172% by 2007, whereas the relationship between debt service and exports will be re-
duced from 19.3% to 16%. In the coming ten years it is reckoned that an average of 120
88 Cf. Nadia Molenaers, Robrecht Renard, Strengthening Civil Society from the Outside? Donor-driven Con-
sultation and Participation Processes in Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSP): the Bolivian Case, IDPM-UA
(Institute of Development Policy and Management/ University of Antwerp) Discussion Paper, no. 5,
2002, www.eurodad.org/uploadstore/cms/docs/IDPMParticipation.pdf (accessed 2003-05-19), p. 7;
Isabel Arauco, Rosalind Eyben, Steps Towards Reducing Exclusion in Bolivia, paper to the World Bank
Conference ABCDE-Europe “Towards Pro-Poor Policies”, Oslo, June 2002, http://wbln0018.worldbank.
org/EURVP/web.nsf/Pages/ABCDE+2002-Papers (accessed 2003-03-11), p. 3, footnote 1; Pedro Valen-
zuela, Conflict Analysis Colombia, Bolivia and the Andean Region, Report for Sida (Swedish International
Development Co-operation Agency), May 2002, www.sida.se/Sida/articles/1600-1699/1625/Saconflict
analysis.pdf (accessed 2003-03-11), p. 15.
89 ODI, Experience with Poverty Reduction Strategies in Latin America and the Caribbean, PRSP synthesis
note, February 5, 2003, www.prspsynthesis.org (accessed 2003-03-07), p. 4.
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million US dollars per year will be available for the struggle against poverty.90 While, from
the NGO point of view, the extent of debt relief is in some doubt, there is no question that
the annual debt service will again considerably increase at the middle of the decade.91
The PRSP has formulated clear goals for the mid to long-term (up to 2005, 2010 and
2015).92 The social objectives up to 2015 comprise in particular the reduction in the inci-
dence of poverty from 63% to 41% of the population, the reduction by half of the inci-
dence of extreme poverty from 36% to 17%,93 an increase in life expectancy from 62 to 69
years, the reduction in infant mortality from 67 to 40 per 1000 births and of maternal
mortality from 390 to 200 per 100,000 births together with significant increases in school
attendance and completion rates. In order to reach these objectives, an economic growth
rate of annually 4% in the 1990s, 5% in the year 2003, and 5.5 % in 2008 is aimed at. This
requires, growth in private investment is to be fostered through further structural re-
forms, including a stable legal and judicial system, more flexible labour markets and
macro-economic stability. The four main components of PRSP are (1) the extension of
employment and income opportunities, in particular for small agricultural producers and
micro-enterprises, (2) the development of human capital by basic education and preven-
tive healthcare, (3) an improved social protection for the poor and (4) the promotion of
social participation and integration. The implementation costs of the strategy are set out
in the PRSP by two different invoices. The first relates public expenditures to all compo-
nents of the PRS. In this case, the PRSP reckons with a needed amount of 7.4 billion US
dollars in the period from 2001 to 2006, whereby half of this is to be financed internally.
Along with this global expenditure, the PRSP also refers to a specific fund for poverty
reduction which is exclusively financed externally: from debt relief and externally financed
projects, the strategy (again for the period from 2001 to 2006) reckons with just under 420
90 Cf. IMF, “IMF and World Bank Support US $1.2 billion in additional debt service relief for Bolivia
Under Enhanced HIPC”, IMF Press Release, no. 01/29, June 8, 2001, www.imf.org (accessed 2002-10-07);
Walther, op. cit. (note 58), p. 8; Mechthild Minkner-Bünjer, Entschuldungsinitiative HIPC für Bolivien:
eine neue Chance für die Armutsbekämpfung?, in: Brennpunkt Lateinamerika. Politik – Wirtschaft – Ge-
sellschaft, no. 24, December 27, 2000, Hamburg (Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde), p. 251.
91 According to IFI reports, debt service will increase again in the second half of the decade from about
US$ 230 million between 2002 and 2005 , and in 2008 will exceed the 300 million mark to lie on average
in the coming decades (2011-2020) at around US$ 680 million. IMF, IDA, Bolivia. Completion Point
Document for the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, May 21, 2001,
www.imf.org (accessed 2002-10-07), pp. 41ff. Depending on the respective bases of reckoning and prog-
nosis, the concrete figures for debt relief as for debt quotas are markedly different; cf. Matthias Woi-
wode, Bolivia: Important Discussions Got Underway, January 2001, www.bolivien-netzwerk.de (accessed
2002-10-04), p. 1; Jubilee 2000 (ed.), Jubilee Research Databank: Profile: Bolivia, www.jubilee2000uk.org
(accessed 2003-03-18).
92 Government of Bolivia, Bolivia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – PRSP, March 2001, La Paz,
www.imf.org (accessed 2002-05-16).
93 The figures are generally not internationally comparable – e.g. with Tanzania. The Bolivian poverty rates
refer to an income-oriented “Headcount Index of Poverty”. The general official poverty line amounts to
an monthly income of about US$ 50; “extreme” poverty is measured by a basket of foodstuff oriented at
the minimum basic needs (monthly US$ 23 in rural districts, and an average of US$ 29 in city areas).
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million US$ per year for the struggle against poverty. From this sum, 104 million derive
from HIPC debt relief.94
The primary responsibility for the struggle against poverty is placed at the door of local
administration (municipalidades). This means essentially that, on the one hand, the HIPC
resources are distributed directly to the communal level by using poverty indicators, and
on the other, indirectly via national development funds. A law passed in July, 2001, the
Ley Diálogo Nacional 2000, institutionalised these mechanisms.95 A transparent distribu-
tion of HIPC funds according to the PRSP is to be reached, in the first place, by directly
channelling the resources from the Central Bank to municipalities and development
funds. In the second place, funds have to be allocated according to a rigid distribution
scheme which grants 20% for school education, 10% for healthcare services and 70% for
municipal investments in “productive and social infrastructure”; this last 70% also flows
via a distribution plan based on poverty indicators mainly to the poorest municipalities.
And thirdly, a general authority managing the different development funds (Directorio
Único de Fondos) is established which, for its part, is subjected to the mechanisms of “so-
cial control” (see below).
The IMF and World Bank acknowledge the PRSP as “a sound poverty diagnosis, the
integration of poverty reduction in a consistent, macro-economic framework, and a ma-
jor effort to broaden participation by including municipalities in the national dialogue.”
Yet “weak institutions, inadequate governance, and corruption; the economy’s vulner-
ability to external shocks; limited acceptance of the PRSP; and possible delays with insti-
tutional reforms“ are emphasised to be a problem.96 A general problem is created by too
optimistic an approach as far as macro-economic projections are concerned which has
already led to distinct adjustment of PRSP objectives. The expected growth rate in the
period from 2003 to 2015 has been reduced from 5/5.5% to 3.9/4.8%, and the poverty
objective for 2015 is now set at a rate of 53.7% (instead of 40.6%), and in the case of ex-
treme poverty at 27.3% (instead of 17.3%) – for a long-term strategy a considerable “ad-
justment” after hardly two years. Contrary to Tanzania, where the “Progress Reports”
mostly speak of successes, it seems that Bolivia since its change of government has realised
a much more critical assessment of its PRSP. The latest government report in early 2003
finds fault with definite weak points right through the range of PRSP components – espe-
cially in the lack of concrete measures to assist the poor.97
94 Government of Bolivia, PRSP, op. cit. (note 92), p. 161ff.
95 Congreso Nacional de Bolivia, Ley 2235 Diálogo Nacional 2000, July 31, 2001, www.veips.gov.bo/pre/
ley/ley2235.html (accessed 2003-03-13).
96 Wayne Lewis, in: Ramiro Cavero Uriona et al, Crafting Bolivia’s PRSP: 5 Points of View, in: Finance &
Development. A quarterly magazine of the IMF, vol. 39, no. 2 (June 2002), www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/fandd/2002/06/cavero.htm (accessed 2002-10-07). For details see IMF, IDA, Bolivia Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper Joint Staff Assessment, May 10, 2001, www.imf.org (accessed 2002-10-07).
97 Cf. UDAPE (Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Ecónomicas), Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de
la Pobreza: Informe de Avance y Perspectivas, La Paz, February 2003, www.ebrp.gov.bo (accessed 2003-05-
19). This is the latest from three governmental PRSP Progress Reports which, however, – in contrast to
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In conjunction with the first HIPC initiative, Walter Eberlei had noted that the expen-
diture “for the social sector did not appreciably increase compared to the previous years”
and that, in addition to this, as the HIPC resources were integrated into the national
budget it became no longer realisable, “whether the available funds do in fact benefit pov-
erty reduction.”98 By comparison, with regard to the second HIPC initiative and PRSP,
progress cannot be denied. On the one hand, the institutionalised “outsourcing” of debt
relief funds from the national budget and their distribution according to a legally pre-
scribed scheme has significantly raised transparency. On the other, an absolute as well as a
relative increase can indeed be noticed in poverty-oriented state expenditure, and here
quite clearly in the areas of education, health and rural development. This, however, only
slightly exceeds the additionally available resources linked to debt relief. Thus a detectable
redeployment of budget allocations in favour of poverty reduction – apart from the pov-
erty oriented use of HIPC funds – is not to be seen, at least on the basis of presented fig-
ures.99 This confirms the general criticism that the PRSP process in Bolivia is concerned
less with a participatory development strategy than with being an instrument for the dis-
tribution of HIPC resources. On the positive side, Bolivia not only shows evidence of a
remarkably innovative concept in the controlled distribution of these funds, but –in nota-
ble contrast to Tanzania – has even legally enshrined the relevant procedures.100
4.1.2. PRSP and Democratisation: a Harmonising Link
In his examination of the relationship between economic development and democratisa-
tion in Bolivia, George Bukes remarked that poverty ought to be overcome not least in the
interests of democracy. “When democracy does not receive backing through develop-
mental and political successes, the negative tendencies can so increase that democracy
the previously two reports from Tanzania – were evidently not presented as official “Progress Reports“
to the IFI, since the reports are neither to be found on the IMF Homepage, nor do exist any IFI staff as-
sessments.
98 Walter Eberlei, HIPC-Initiative und Armutsbekämpfung, a paper commissioned by the Jubilee 2000
campaign of the dioceses of Hildesheim and Trier, January 2000, www.bolivien-netzwerk.de (accessed
2002-05-23), p. 4.
99 In this way, “poverty-related expenditures” increase in relation to GDP from 10% (1997) to 12.2%
(2003) or, in comparison to expenditure as a whole, from 35.6% (1997) to 43.6% (2003). If, however,
one subtracts the additional resources available through debt relief, an increase of poverty-oriented ex-
penditure remains of 10% of the GDP (1997) to 10.7% (2003) or as the case may be, of 35.6% of the ex-
penditure as a whole (1997) to a good 38% (2003). Cf. IMF, IDA, Bolivia. Completion Point Document,
op. cit. (note 91), Tabs 2, 3; IMF, Bolivia: Statistical Annex, Country Report no. 01/91, June 25, 2001,
www.imf.org (accessed 2003-05-19), p. 24; partly independent calculations.
100 Bolivian PRSP mechanisms of course do not guarantee correct use of monies, but they do make irregu-
larities more easily detectable. Thus, a decree issued by the government in December, 2002 concerning
additional bilateral debt relief beyond HIPC II to the tune of US$ 30 million annually assigned these re-
sources – in violation of the Dialogue Law – directly to the national budget. This met with direct and
resolute criticism from the local administrations, the Catholic Church as well as from the newly estab-
lished national institution for social control (Mecanismo Nacional de Control Social, see below); cf. re-
ports in the daily paper, La Razón, www.la-razon.com, e.g. from March, 12, 2003, April, 14, 2003, and
April 15, 2003.
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cannot stand up.”101 Basically, the PRSP concept is in agreement with this analysis.
Whereas democracy plays no role in Tanzania’s PRSP, in Bolivia “improving the quality
of democracy” is in fact an explicit political objective of the PRSP and an essential build-
ing block – the reduction of poverty being considered as a necessary condition for the
preservation of democracy, just as democratisation is considered a pre-condition for the
effective struggle against poverty.102
In this way, PRSP also integrates structural adjustment into a harmonising configura-
tion in which success in all three dimensions is dependent on one another as working
alternately to strengthen one another. Structural adjustment may well have laid down the
foundations for economic stability, but not for overcoming social exclusion and poverty.
The social upheavals of 2000, however, showed that poverty, inequality and social exclu-
sion put democracy at risk. For this reason, growth-oriented economic reforms require
the sociopolitical complement of direct poverty reduction, just as success in the struggle
against poverty is based on a successful economic policy.103 In addition, the objective of
eradicating poverty demands “joint responsibility between state and society in combating
social exclusion”, and here democratic participation comes into play. Programmatically
speaking, this requires more than mere consultation. Indeed the PRSP expresses “the need
for the general public to become involved in steering the strategy”, and the National Dia-
logue 2000 is described as the first step towards “making democratic debate a central ele-
ment in improving the quality of democracy”.104
At the centre of the democracy oriented dimensions of the Bolivian PRSP there is the
area of decentralisation and participation which coalesce in the notion of “social control”
of political decisions (through “civil society”) at local level. Along with it are concrete
demands for institution-/capacity-building, combating corruption and reform of the judi-
cial system which can be subsumed under the term good governance. The “promotion of
social integration and grassroots participation” is placed among the four strategic compo-
nents of PRSP. This entails, together with the strengthening of “citizen organization and
participation”, the dismantling of inequality and of those barriers which rest upon ethnic
discrimination. Some PRSP sections are concerned with rights and opportunities for in-
digenous groups and women.105
101 Georg Bukes, Der Zusammenhang von wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und Demokratisierung. Das Beispiel
Bolivien, Hamburg (Institut für Lateinamerika-Kunde), 2000, p. 167.
102 Cf. Government of Bolivia, PRSP, op. cit. (note 92), p. 14, see also pp. 11, 113.
103 Relevant quotations which formulate these relationships are to be found in ibid., pp. 11ff, 17.
104 Ibid., p. 12. In this, the dialogue is described – in terms of the deliberative democracy as outlined by
Juergen Habermas – as “public forum in which society’s participants, both territorial and functional,
could join with the political system’s players and agree on a State policy for the fight against poverty and
social exclusion” (ibid., p. 12). The PRSP speaks explicitly of a “deliberative process” on which the PRSP
is based and also of a contribution of a national dialogue “to development of participatory democracy”
(ibid., pp. 12, 43).
105 Cf. Government of Bolivia, PRSP, op. cit. (note 92), pp. 17, 113ff, 118, 122ff, 138.
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4.1.3. Participation and Ownership: Bolivian Best Practices?
For many observers, and in comparison with previous consultation processes in Bolivia,
the PRSP process appears to be a considerable step in the direction of civil society partici-
pation. A closer inspection, however, discovers an ambiguous picture regarding the degree
and form of participation where matters appear on the one hand “very progressive” and
“extremely limited and exclusive” on the other.106
The very heart of the participation process was the three-month National Dialogue
2000 (in what follows referred to as “ND”) which preceded the drafting of the PRSP. Con-
ceived in the government’s original conception only to deal with the distribution of HIPC
resources, this “social agenda”, due to pressure from the public, was then broadened to
include an “economic” and a “political agenda”. However, the extent of consultations
outside the “social” area remained very restricted. At the centre of deliberations were the
four themes of: the causes of poverty, the mechanisms of distributing HIPC resources,
participation in the monitoring of their application and the ND follow-up.107 In the sense
of a bottom-up process, the dialogue was based on discussion fora at local level which
focussed on concrete issues of poverty reduction and distribution of financial resources.
The results were introduced into regional and national consultations, and once again it
was only public pressure which led to the opening up of these consultations to include a
wider range of social groups. The decision of the “donor community”, through a specific
fund, to support the participation of “civil society” in the ND proved supportive.108 The
extent of participation has been assessed by the IMF as “extensive with over 1,200 people
at the municipal level taking part”.109
Along with the ND, independent processes of social discussion and co-ordination took
place. Among others, a federation of small businesses originating from the informal sector
(Comité de Enlace) organised its own independent consultation process. The Foro Jubileo
initiated by the Catholic Church, was of considerable significance.110 Via financial support
from donors and international NGOs, a parallel, bottom-up process was launched which
culminated in a three-day national forum (Foro Nacional Jubileo 2000) to pass a common
106 Christian Aid, Participating in Dialogue?: The Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de la Pobreza, Christian
Aid policy briefing, January 2002, www.christian-aid.org.uk (accessed 2002-10-02), p. 4.
107 Cavero et al, op. cit. (note 96), p. 1.
108 Cf. McGee, Assessing Participation..., op. cit. (note 58), p. 31.
109 Lewis, in: Cavero et al, op. cit. (note 96).
110 In the Bolivian Jubilee 2000 campaign, Foro Jubileo 2000, 40 Bolivian NGOs (among them trade union
associations, employer’s association, umbrella organisations of the small farmers, students, pensioners,
handicapped people, and indígenas) were brought together. During the forums within the framework of
the foro in the spring of 2000, altogether over 800 organisations and institutions took part. This was
conducted under the auspices of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference. Cf. Dietmar Müßig, Schuldenerlass
zur Armutsbekämpfung?, in: ila – Zeitschrift der Informationsstelle Lateinamerika, no. 244, April 2001,
Bonn, p. 13.
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point of view. Again, it was public and international pressure which allowed for the in-
corporation of this contribution into the official dialogue.111
According to official statements, the results of the National Dialogue served as a
“starting point for the preparation of the PRSP”.112 The elaboration of the PRSP remained
the task of the government; the first draft, however, was re-worked after short public
consultations and indeed modified in certain areas, especially with regard to the indige-
nous population, gender and environmental issues. The ODI remarked that this “consul-
tation effected significant change in the PRSP”.113 Bolivian NGOs, however, described the
modifications to the PRSP as “of no great importance”.114 In actual fact, the ND 2000 did
contribute to the extension of decentralisation and popular participation which was pro-
posed in the PRSP and implemented with the Ley Diálogo Nacional. With this law, the ND
is formalised as a PRSP monitoring process which, among other things, is to bring about
greater social control of the distribution of resources (from the debt relief and from the
development funds). The procedural bases for this are the new mechanisms of social con-
trol (Mecanismo Nacional de Control Social) as well as strengthened local authorities. “So-
cial control” (as demanded by the Foro Jubileo 2000) does not mean participation in the
sense of co-administration of state expenditure, but the institutionalisation of an inde-
pendent control which is co-ordinated by the Catholic Church.115 Social monitoring via
regular dialogues is also linked to the dynamic evolution of the poverty reduction strategy.
Nevertheless, in the literature regarding PRSP in Bolivia some hard criticism of the
actual conduct of the process has been voiced.116 Complaints about the marginalisation of
parliament, political parties and the opposition are most prominent. In the ND, the par-
liament as an institution was simply not involved. Neither was the opposition drawn into
the drafting of the PRSP, and as far as the Foro was concerned, all political parties were on
principle excluded. This is not only problematical from the point of view of democratic
theory. It also has quite practical consequences, since the long-term implementation of
111 Cf. Genevieve Painter, Quality Participation In Poverty Reduction Strategies. Experiences from Malawi,
Bolivia and Rwanda (Draft), April 2002, www.angonet.org/servidor_ReducaoDaPobreza.html (accessed
2003-03-11), p. 32.
112 Ramiro Cavero Uriona, in: Cavero et al., op. cit. (note 96).
113 ODI, Experience with Poverty Reduction Strategies..., op. cit. (note 89), pp. 6ff.
114 Hugo Fernández, Preguntas claves para examinar el concepto de los DELP, A Paper to the World Bank
“Latin American Forum on Poverty Reduction Strategies”, December 3-4, 2001, Santa Cruz, Bolivia,
www.worldbank.org (accessed 2003-03-13), p. 4.
115 Cf. Georg Krekeler, Irene Tokarski, Entschuldung und Zivilgesellschaft. Länderbeispiel Bolivien, study
commissioned by Misereor, Aachen, August 2000, www.bolivien-netzwerk.de (accessed 2002-10-04),
p. 9.
116 The following concerns in particular the evaluation of these documents und analyses: Molenaers, Re-
nard, op. cit. (note 88); Painter, op. cit. (note 111); IMF, IDA, Background Information, op. cit. (note
73); ODI, Experience with Poverty Reduction Strategies..., op. cit. (note 89); Fernández, op. cit. (note 114);
Cavero et al, op. cit. (note 96); Christian Aid, op. cit. (note 106); Krekeler, Tokarksi, op. cit. (note 115);
CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), The Experience of Bolivia with the PRSP Approach,
Brown Bag Hosted by CIDA’s Poverty Reduction Network, December 14, 2001, www.acdi-cida.ca (ac-
cessed 2002-10-07); Walther, op. cit. (note 58).
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PRSP depends on an ownership reaching beyond the small circle of people currently in-
volved in government.117 In addition, neither were the “poor” very well represented at the
consultation table. For the most part no independent representatives of social groups took
part in discussion at local level, but a select group of already existing local representatives,
who, within the framework of the participación popular form the municipal level of the
political system. Local consultations – the basis of the ND – served more as a dialogue
between central state and local political elites.118 In addition, a large cross-section of the
poor population were hindered in participating because the documents were not trans-
lated into indigenous languages nor delivered in an easily comprehensible form. In this
way, the ND was lost to women, indigenous people, urban and rural poor. Where the
“civil society” was drawn into the dialogue this was primarily through the traditionally
strong organisations, the larger NGOs and the Catholic Church which, via the Jubilee
Debt Relief Campaign, became the focal point of social discussion, co-ordination and
organisation, and will, within the framework of the mechanisms of “social control”, cer-
tainly remain so. However, even regarding the independent parallel process, there was
complaint about insufficient embracement of social movements, indigenous communities
and (to a lesser extent) trade unions.
Not only was the scope of participation limited, but, furthermore, it varied markedly
depending on the themes to be discussed. The government reserved the right to selectively
invite participants to the respective “agendas”, and, as far as the “Economic Agenda” was
concerned, large sections of the society were excluded. In addition, the government de-
termined the topics to be discussed and, in principle, excluded macro-economic subjects.
This apparently corresponded with the intentions of the IFI. Accordingly, an IMF repre-
sentative is quoted as emphasising that the demands of the social forum “should influence
the ND [National Dialogue] but only in terms of shaping allocations of [...HIPC] funds,
and that macro-economic targets were not open to discussion”.119 In the governmental
description of the dialogue on the “Economic Agenda”, any controversy is simply absent.
On the contrary, one gains the impression that civil society wished to force through the
117 Following the elections in the summer of 2002, the poverty strategy was largely ignored. The new gov-
ernment of the former head of state, Sánchez de Lozada, apparently didn’t feel sufficiently involved in
the planning of the strategy on the part of her predecessor. Only after a lot of controversy did the new
coalition government agree to adopt the poverty strategy – and still announcing modifications. Cf. ODI,
Experience with Poverty Reduction Strategies..., op. cit. (note 89), p. 6.
118 Cf. Molenaers, Renard, op. cit. (note 88), p. 17. The local round tables comprised the mayor, the vice
president of the local council, the president of the “Vigilance Committee” (an independent group of citi-
zens comprising the local control organ) and one woman elected from this committee. On the other
hand, the ND lacked any kind of connection to the indigenous communities which comprise about 70%
of the population.
119 Cit. McGee, Assessing Participation..., op. cit. (note 58), pp. 32ff. Many NGOs criticize a “pre-set policy
agenda” from government and the “international community”, “which essentially preserved the struc-
tural adjustment measures already in place”. ODI, Experience with Poverty Reduction Strategies..., op. cit.
(note 89), p. 8. Despite the comprehensive control over the dialogues it was neither possible within the
framework of the “Economic” nor the “Political Agenda” to come to articulate common inputs to the
PRSP.
36 Hans-Joachim Spanger/Jonas Wolff
previous reforms.120 It appears in the PRSP that – and here the experiences in both Bolivia
and Tanzania fit perfectly with general criticism of the PRSP process – the macro-
economic framework of the strategy is already pre-determined to make sure the continu-
ity of former reform policies.121 Yet discussion was not only restricted in the area of
macro-economic stabilisation and structural adjustment, but also as far as politically
highly charged issues were concerned such as land distribution and reform, re-
distribution policies in general, the highly controversial policies of privatisation or the
subjects of coca plantation and drugs, themes which are largely left out of account. As a
result of these ND selection processes it was possible for the government to radically “de-
politicise” the subject of poverty. The enforcement of these constraints on participation
was facilitated by the time pressure exerted on the dialogue by the desired debt relief.
The deficiencies and gaps of the consultation process culminate in the problem that
the participative process – regardless of all the innovations and successes – had to fall
short of its main objective, namely, the generation of some social consensus regarding
poverty reduction strategy. This failure was made perfectly clear when seven networks of
Bolivian NGOs, as well as the technical team of the Foro Jubileo 2000 in a letter to the ex-
ecutive directors of the IMF and World Bank demanded the rejection of the PRSP.122 The
lack of a social consensus is also underlined by the renewed severe social protests in Feb-
ruary, 2003, during which 30 people died and at least 100 were injured (and which turned
out to be only a prelude to the social explosions of October, 2003, which led to the ousting
of President Sánchez de Lozada). Among other things, the protests were provoked by the
measures to reduce the budget deficit agreed upon in the credit negotiations between the
government and the IMF (especially the introduction of a new income tax).123 The hope of
120 Cf. Government of Bolivia, PRSP, op. cit. (note 92), pp. 44ff, 51ff.
121 This continuity in the macro-economic strategies in PRSP is clearly emphasised and is reflected dis-
tinctly in economic and political objectives. Public debt, for example, should be reduced quickly and in-
dependently from business cycle or socio-political requirements. Monetary policy, on the other hand,
remains exclusively oriented towards price stability. From the trade political point of view, the problem
of falling terms of trade is to be encountered with further structural reforms and the progressive liber-
alisation of trade. Further, the role of the state which is to be strengthened in its task of regulation cor-
responds to the well-known neo-liberal ideas of the state seen as an efficiently administered provider of
public services. Cf. Government of Bolivia, PRSP, op. cit. (note 92), pp. 13, 137, 195, 200ff. A further in-
dication of continuity of IMF programme set-up is given by the simple renaming of the currently run-
ning IMF credit agreements. Bolivia’s current economic programme which was accepted by the IMF in
September, 1998, under the then structural adjustment facility (ESAF) was simply renamed as PRGF
agreement.
122 “We are for poverty reduction, but not like this”, letter documented in: Angonet, www.angonet.org/
Servidor_ReducaoPobrezy/PRSP/documentps/WeAreForPovertyBut.htm (accessed 2003-03-11). The
Undersigned criticize among other things that the strategy relies upon a continuity of structural adjust-
ment policies without attention to their effects on poverty, that it is based on the conventional patterns
of economic growth as a key to reduce poverty without tackling social inequality in Bolivia with a re-
distribution of income, and that the PRSP and the ND law will only increase the “serious financial and
technical problems in facing local development administration”, among other issues, through a decen-
tralisation which, at local level, is neither covered by resources nor capacity.
123 Cf. e.g. The Economist, Bolivia. What Will the IMF say now?, February 22, 2003, p. 33; WEED press re-
lease, „WEED zu Bolivien: Gewalt ist eine Folge der verfehlten Politik des IWF – IWF soll Politikdiktat
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IMF and World Bank that “the institutionalisation of the national dialogue process might
reduce these tensions by providing channels for the peaceful expression of dissent”124 does
not yet seem to have been fulfilled. The simultaneity of consensus oriented dialogue proc-
esses and vehement social protest (accompanied by violent and repressive state reaction)
in the course of the year 2000 early indicated the limited legitimacy and scope of the PRSP
process.125 Ignoring issues such as coca eradication and privatisation in the PRSP process,
and the inadequate integration of traditional, rural communities and social movements
have proved detrimental. The transformation of behaviour of social groups from protesta
(protest) to propuesta (proposal), attributed to the process of participation, only concerns
a very small, and in any case already well-integrated section of the much-lauded “civil
society”.126
The rejection of the PRSP by large sections of organised society in Bolivia demon-
strates that one can certainly not speak of national ownership of the strategy. As the re-
served attitude of the new government under Sánchez de Lozada towards PRSP shows,
not even the traditional political elite feels comfortable as “owners” of the strategy.
Whether one can speak at least of ownership limited to the Banzer administration is diffi-
cult to say. Contrary to structural adjustment and stabilisation policies the extension of
participation and decentralisation can certainly not be regarded as the “intellectual prop-
erty” of this government.127 The ODI, for its part, observes “criticisms about the lack of
government ownership of the PRSP outside the key ministries involved in the drafting
process” which are of a political as well as of a technical nature – a scepticism which is also
reminiscent of Tanzania.128
In the PRSP, the national dialogue is largely attributed to the far reaching function of
having “contributed to development of participatory democracy while strengthening civil
society and the policy system through an enhanced relationship between these parties” – a
aufgeben“ , February 14, 2003; Juan Forero, Economic Crisis and Vocal Opposition Test Bolivia’s Presi-
dent, in: The New York Times, February 16, 2003, www.nytimes.com (accessed 2002-03-07).
124 IMF, IDA, Bolivia PRSP Joint Staff Assessment, May 10, 2001, www.imf.org, p. 11 (accessed 2002-10-07).
125 For Mechthild Minkner-Bünjer, the escalating protests in September, 2000, already represented the end
for the moment of “the dream of co-operation between government and representatives of the poor in
the HPIC initiative. [...] The Banzer government which a few weeks before had praised the struggle
against poverty within the framework of the HPIC initiative, the democratic attitude of the regime, and
that of the civil society, now saw itself confronted with a furious multitude. [...] The ‘blue smoke screen’
of participation and debt relief could no longer veil the precarious situation well below the poverty line.”
Minkner-Bünjer, op. cit. (note 90), p. 256.
126 Cf. Molenaers, Renard, op. cit. (note 88), p. 12.
127 “The shift from policy conditionality to process conditionality has made little difference in some coun-
tries (Bolivia, Mozambique) because they have already adjusted so much to the policies and professional
mindsets favoured by the World Bank and IMF that policy conditions are now not needed to reinforce
these.“ McGee, Assessing Participation..., op. cit. (note 58), p. 15.
128 ODI, Experience with Poverty Reduction Strategies, op. cit. (note 89), p. 5. The NGO representative, Hugo
Fernández, also reports that the sector ministries were only marginally involved in the PRSP process;
Fernández, op. cit. (note 114), p. 2.
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view which is partially shared by some NGOs and external observers.129 And despite all
criticism, PRSP has provided new opportunities. For instance, external support and
pressure on the part of the donors and NGOs made it possible to engage in independent
participation processes.130 The extent of engagement of social groups in the National Dia-
logue was also considerably greater than in Banzer’s first National Dialogue. Of prime
importance is, after all, the institutionalisation of the mechanisms developed during the
PRSP process which otherwise was not to be expected. It is, however, too early for an
evaluation of the importance of these institutional reforms. The National Dialogue 2003
was consistently delayed, and its significance played down by the government which em-
phasised that parliament was responsible for processing social demands.131 In the present
highly polarised political situation, the subject of a participative revision or further devel-
opment of PRSP is not on the agenda. Much more important is whether it will be possible
to bring the embittered social and political groups within the country to a social “sum-
mit” or to a “social pact”.132 With regard to the fault lines of Bolivian democracy revealed
by the recent escalation of social conflict, the PRSP process remains largely without
means. The marginalisation of parliament and the systematic limitation of discussion
excluding controversial issues can rather contribute to bringing these conflicts to a head.
4.2. Tanzania
The banning of “ignorance, disease, poverty“ has been among the major objectives of the
Tanzanian government since the foundation of the country. And until the 1970s, good
progress had been made according to official estimates. However, because of “various
domestic and external shocks and policy weaknesses”, it has been officially acknowledged
that there has been a substantial stagnation and the situation has considerably deterio-
rated since then. The Washington financial institutions confirm both statements, but
come to a different diagnosis of the country’s lack of success. In their opinion, the policies
of the government have not been “sufficiently growth oriented” and “expenditure pro-
grams were typically under funded and poorly prioritised”. This has radically changed in
the last few years, since the “[p]olicies for sustained economic growth are now assigned
high priority and the importance of maintaining macro-economic stability is fully ac-
knowledged” as well as “broad-based participation” in the PRSP process has revealed the
129 Government of Bolivia, PRSP, op. cit. (note 92), p. 43. Cf. Juan Carlos Núñez, in: Cavero et al, op. cit.
(note 96); McGee, Assessing Participation..., op. cit. (note 58), p. 30.
130 “[It] must be clearly stated that without the trend-setting decision of the G-7 countries during the Co-
logne Summit with regard to the debt relief issue and the conditions associated with it [i.e. HIPC II und
PRSP] a social campaign for more social control and poverty orientation in politics could not have been
expected for Bolivia in the foreseeable future.” Krekeler, Tokarksi, op. cit. (note 115), p. 18.
131 Cf. e.g. the reports in the Bolivian daily, La Razón, from April 15, 2003 (www.la-razon.com) as well as
Red ATB from April 15, 2003 (see www.bolivia.com).
132 Cf. e.g. La Razón (April 28, 2003, May 6, 2003, May 8, 2003, May 9, 2003), www.la-razon.com.
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“multi-dimensional aspects of poverty”133 As a consequence, it was the IMF and the World
Bank which led Tanzania onto the economic and political path of virtue which the coun-
try has been following since the mid-1980s, at first rather hesitantly and since 1996 with
determination.134
The abundance of national reforms and poverty reduction plans which have been set
up recently and which, apparently, have been rather uncoordinated – “relatively decen-
tralized” in official parlance – reflect this rapprochement process. Among these is the
“Vision 2025” in which long-term economic and social objectives are layed down. This
provides the basis for the “National Poverty Eradication Strategy”, planned on the me-
dium term up to 2010. Next comes the “Tanzania Assistance Strategy”, a medium-term
development strategy for common efforts together with the donor community, and also
the “Medium-Term Expenditure Framework“ for budget planning. And finally, the PRSP
has been added, as a medium-term orientated strategy and as a distinctive feature “subject
to relatively hard (central Government) budget constraints”.135
4.2.1. The PRSP: Wish and Reality in Combating Poverty
In March, 2000, the Tanzanian government presented its Interim PRSP.136 Hardly six
months later, the completed PRSP followed which after evaluation by the IMF and the
World Bank was officially endorsed in December. It is nowhere so detailed or compre-
hensive as the Bolivian PRSP. The first of the “Progress Reports” followed on time in
August, 2001.137 Upon acceptance in November, the “Completion Point Document” was
presented to the country, wherewith the desired debt relief for Tanzania within the
framework of HIPC was made possible. The qualifying “Decision Point” had already been
achieved in April of that year.138
The staff at the IMF and World Bank respectively noted on the Progress Report that
“significant achievements” had been made as far as the substance of the programme was
133 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint Staff Assessment by the Staffs of the IMF and IDA, November 2, 2000, p.
2, in: www.imf.org (accessed 2002-06-20).
134 See on the history of structural adjustment in Tanzania Felix Naschold, Adrian Fozzard, How, When and
Why Does Poverty Get Budget Priority? Poverty Reduction Strategy and Public Expenditure in Tanzania,
London (ODI Working Paper no. 165) April 2002, pp. 1-5.
135 The United Republic of Tanzania, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, October 1, 2000, pp. 3f, in:
www.imf.org (accessed 2002-06-20).
136 United Republic of Tanzania, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), March 14, 2000, in:
www.imf.org (accessed 2002-06-20). However, the poverty strategy is valid only for the mainland; Zan-
zibar is not mentioned anywhere – not even in the statistics. In addition to this, the donor community
had severely limited co-operation with Zanzibar after the highly controversial elections which the new
government under President Karume tried to loosen by the setting up of an independent PRSP in 2001.
137 The United Republic of Tanzania, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Progress Report 2000/01, August 14,
2001, in: www.imf.org (accessed 2002-06-20).
138 IMF, IDA, Tanzania. Completion Point Document for the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative, November 8, 2001, p. 5, in: www.imf.org (accessed 2002-06-20).
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concerned and also with an eye to the political changes which had been made in favour of
the poor and in the establishment of a “more open and consultative environment for the discus-
sion of policy”. Still requested, however, were (1) a thorough evaluation of the new poverty hous-
hold survey of the year 2000, (2) an investigation into the relationships between macro-economic
policies, structural reforms and poverty, (3) a detailed costing of the planned measures, (4) as well
as the setting up of the announced strategy of rural development and a concrete plan on the imple-
mentation of the agricultural strategy.139 The second Progress Report for the year 2001/02 which
with delay appeared in March, 2003, presented the – predominant – successes in the implementa-
tion of the PRSP.140
Even the IMF and the World Bank admitted that the speed with which the Tanzania
government had set up its PRSP was considerably owing to the desire “to move as quickly
as possible to the HIPC completion point.”141 In this way, Tanzania qualified for a debt
relief of about 50% or 2 billion US dollars and managed to reduce its debt to a level which
at a net current level of 150% of the export earnings was deemed sustainable over the long
term by the financial institutions. Without considering the bilateral relief, this gives a
medium-term debt service at just under 150 million US dollars, which in 1998/9 was still
224 million dollars. As a result, Tanzania can add 70 million US dollars to its budget – to
be used in the fight against poverty.142 Although this lowers the debt service to less than
10% of export earnings, it is generally agreed among all participants in Tanzania as in
Washington, that due to the continued high deficits in the current account and for real-
ising PRSP aims high external financial needs will persist. In this connection, the IMF and
World Bank in the forefront and during the course of the PRSP process have recently
promised 500 million US dollars in new credits. As with Bolivia, the debt will again in-
crease after the middle of the decade and gradually exhaust the relief.
The PRSP differentiates between various forms and aspects of poverty, which extends
from income via education and health up to vulnerability to unforeseeable events.143 Even
when the relevant data stem from the year 1991 and are therefore only of limited value,
139 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP – Progress Report. Joint Staff Assessment by the Staffs of the IMF and IDA,
November 1, 2001, pp. 1, 7, in: www.imf.org (accessed 2002-06-20).
140 The United Republic of Tanzania, Poverty Reduction Strategy. The Second Progress Report 2001/02, March
2003, in: www.worldbank.org (accessed 2003-05-05). As to the earlier announcement, cf. “IMF com-
pletes the Fourth Review Under Tanzania’s PRGF Arrangement and Approves US $25 Million Dis-
bursement“, IMF News Brief, no. 02/34, April 16, 2002, in: www.imf.org (accessed 2002-06-20).
141 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 133), p. 1.
142 Cf. Michael Hanfstängl, Wie wirkt sich der HIPC-II-Schuldenerlass auf die Armutsbekämpfung Tansanias
aus?, January 29, 2001, pp. 3f, in: www.tanzania-network.de (from 19.9.2002). Measured by the average
debt service of the 1990s, and with regard to agreed and bilateral prospective relief, he arrived at between
50 and 100 million US dollars a year, which can also be traced to the fact that the publicized data – even
from the same institutions – also considerably deviate from one another; see Michael Hanfstängl, “Wie
geht es weiter mit der Entschuldung und Armutsbekämpfung in Tansania?”, February 27, 2003, in:
www.tanzania-network.de (accessed 2003-05-19).
143 “Vulnerability” is not, however, more closely treated up to the second “Progress Report“– “in the ab-
sence of a clear understanding of the concept and its manifestations in Tanzania”, as it is to be seen in
the “Executive Summary”.
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the PRSP proceeds from the assumption that roughly 50% of the population are poor and
not in a position to satisfy their basic needs, while 30% are extremely poor so as not to be
able even to feed themselves.144 However, on the basis of new statistical data from 2001
these figures were cut down without giving details in the Second Progress Report. Ac-
cording to these, 35.7% of the population are not in a position to furnish their basic needs
and 18.7% find themselves on the border of starvation.145
The priorities of the PRSP correspond with the “millennium objectives”, yet poverty,
as well as infant, child and maternal mortality is to be halved by the year 2010 already.
Moreover, there is to be an increase by 2003 of primary schooling up to 85% of children
as well as an increase in the access of the rural community to clean water. This is to in-
crease from 48.5% in the year 2000 to 55% in 2003.146 The Second Progress Report docu-
ments greatest successes in the education sector. In the health sector, in the water supply
and in the building and maintenance of traffic infrastructure, considerable problems are
still outstanding, so that the intended objectives for the year 2003 were impaired. In all,
the PRSP lists seven sectors as requiring urgent attention to which the government wishes
to “confine” its financial commitments: primary education and basic health, water supply,
the building and maintenance of roads, judicial issues, the promotion of agriculture and
AIDS.147
144 The United Republic of Tanzania, PRSP..., op. cit. (note 135), pp. 5-10. In the Interim PRSP we find that
15 to 18 million Tanzanians (50% of the population) have less than US $0.65 a day and nearly 12.5 mil-
lion less than US $0.50 a day in order to feed themselves.
145 On the other hand, it is asserted that the rural areas are most hard hit (57% and 32% in the old, 38.7%
and 20.4% in the new statistical data) and Dar es Salaam the least (where, however, the proportions are
reversed, since, in the old statistics it was 5.6% without adequate basic needs, and in the new it is as-
sessed at 17.6%). The United Republic of Tanzania, The Second Progress Report…, op. cit. (note 140), pp.
4f. It is irritating to realise that the data for 1991/92 were corrected to give lower values without a reason
being supplied. According to these, it is only 38.6% without basic needs and in the matter of food 21.6%
of the population which can be rated as “poor”.
146 These objectives are by no means new. They were cited for the education sector in the last “Policy
Framework Paper” on structural adjustment – in the expectation, however, that their implementation
could already be realized by 2001 or 2002. Cf. Tanzania, Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. Policy
Framework Paper for 1998/99-2000/01, Prepared by the Tanzanian Authorities in Collaboration with the
Staffs of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, January 19, 1999, pp. 14f, in:
www.imf.org (accessed 2002-06-20). One serious problem is referred to which does not turn up in the
PRSP: the “genuine crisis” in tertiary education with 1% students only. This does not touch upon the
poverty situation in Tanzania too closely, since tertiary training only concerns the privileged classes
anyway, but it is a massive sign of poverty of the country. If the PRSP, therefore, is the single significant
developmental instrument in the future, then this is the point where things can easily move into a wrong
direction. With this in mind, the Second Progress Report announced that there will be a strategy re-
garding secondary education up to 2005.
147 The United Republic of Tanzania, PRSP..., op. cit. (note 135), p. 22. Here, too, in the second “Progress
Report” there has been a change, as AIDS, together with gender, good governance, environment and
employment policies, were introduced as a “cross-cutting issue”, which ought to deserve particular at-
tention “as they have a bearing on initiatives towards poverty reduction” (p. VII). IMF und World Bank
still miss measures to control the population growth in the PRSP; cf. IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint
Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 133), p. 5.
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Neither the Tanzanian PRSP nor the IMF and World Bank entertain the slightest
doubt that the decisive condition for the struggle against poverty is economic growth gen-
erated by the “steady pursuit of sound macro-economic policies” and the continued im-
plementation of structural reforms in the interests of increasing market efficiency. This
alone – thus the praise from Washington – has accounted for “the strong economic per-
formance” over the last few years.148 And indeed, since the introduction of the PRSP – in
stark contrast to Bolivia – the most optimistic aspirations have been fulfilled. The gross
domestic product grew in 2001 by 5.6% (2000: 4.9%; 1999: 4.7%); inflation sank further
again to below 5% and the currency reserves rose to a point where import needs were
covered for six months – and this despite a current account deficit which still amounts to
10% of GDP.
However, the projections also indicate that, in order to halve poverty, future growth
rates in excess of 7% will be needed. In addition, growth has been concentrated over the
last few years on (gold) mining and tourism which show the lowest effect in employment.
Tourism, for example, employing 170,000, accounts for only 1% of the able-bodied
population and contributes 14% to the GDP, while mining for only 2.5%. Agriculture tells
another story. Here, 80% of the nation’s human resources are employed and the contri-
bution to the GDP is 50% (from which, however, almost half accounts for subsistence).
Yet, agricultural growth remained at 5.5% in 2001 (after being 3.4% in 2000) just under
the average and was, moreover, seriously affected by the still declining market prices of
most important export goods such as coffee, cotton and cashew nuts. For this reason
alone, economic growth as such can only have modest effects. The Second Progress Re-
port therefore complains that good macro-economic performance has not been trans-
formed into “micro-level benefits”. This remains an unsolved challenge.149
As to the direct and concerted attack on poverty, not only budgetary reallocation is
planned within the framework of the PRSP, but also the elaboration of sectoral strategies
which will constitute a sensible application of increased funds. Among these belong the
“National Strategy for Primary Education” which was completed in 2001 and, as a deci-
sive measure, announced the abolition of school fees in the area of primary education.
These were – on recommendation and in compliance with the then valid guidelines of the
World Bank – first introduced in the 1990s and apparently contributed to a decrease in
schooling.150 Another important document is the Agricultural Sector Development Strat-
148 Cf. e.g. “IMF, IMF completes Fifth Review Under Tanzania’s PRGF Arrangement and Approves US $27
Million Disbursement”, IMF News Brief, no. 02/115, November 19, 2002, www.imf.org (accessed 2002-
06-20).
149 The United Republic of Tanzania, The Second Progress Report…, op. cit. (note 140), p. 20. That this
could concern delicate issues of economic power is at least hinted at when the changes concerning
“macro-incentives” in agriculture are complained of as in no way always reaching their addressees, the
farmers, but fall into the hands of traders and “middle men” (p. 22).
150 Cf. Nancy C. Alexander, Takoma Park, Paying for Education: How the World Bank & IMF Influence
Education in Developing Countries, January 2002, in: www.challengeglobalization.org (accessed 2003-03-
20). The fact that greater flexibility has occurred here may well be attributed to the legal initiative of the
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egy which was also completed in the summer of 2001, but, because of the much more
complex challenge, is still waiting to be implemented. Among other matters, it is intended
here to introduce further tax relief, give assistance to successful marketing, as well as re-
forms in order to expand and diversify the “pro-poor” sectors “with a view to enabling the
poor to share increasingly in the benefits of globalisation”. The departure from an agri-
cultural sector with collective-type features such as the Ujamaa-concept which, in addi-
tion, had been burdened with the financial weight of (the state’s) industrial plans certainly
encouraged activities at grass-roots level, but also released substantial “discontent”. A
whole series of – “as far as possible market-orientated” – measures is intended to work
against it.151
Even if at the time of adopting the PRSP, an exact costing of the desired measures was
lacking, the budget shows a substantial increase in expenditure for the listed priority sec-
tions. These have risen from 4.4% of the GDP in the fiscal year, 1999/2000, to over 6.3%
in 2000/01, 9% in 2001/02 to 11% in 2002/3.152 This, however, does not change the fact
that large financing gaps persist and it is not sure whether these will be closed by foreign
donors. The PRSP has already admitted that the measures for reducing poverty depend, as
in the past, heavily on the availability of external resources, a fact which leads to consider-
able insecurity in planning. It is intended to use 70% of the of the planned expenditures
from internal resources and 30% from external. This signifies an increase in the calculated
ODA income of just under 350 million US dollars in the fiscal year 1999/2000 to ap-
proximately 500 million US dollars in 2002/03. 153 Since Tanzania had spent 6.24 US dol-
lars per head of the population in 1998/99 on debt service and almost the same amount
for education (6.28 US dollars)154, the problem remains even after debt relief that the
available resources fall far short of covering all the facets of poverty reduction – or even
the priorities.
4.2.2. PRSP and Democratisation: a Peripheral Phenomenon
As opposed to Bolivia, there is no mention of democratisation in the Tanzanian PRSP, but
governance and institutional reform are being mentioned – though as a relatively periph-
eral issue. This might sound remarkable, since there has been a democratic change going
on in Tanzania for years. Between 1995 and 2000, multi-party elections took place for the
first time since the 1960s in which, however, the ruling party, CCM, could easily win the
US Congress which urged the representatives of the US in the IFI to block all funds, should these be as-
sociated with demands for fees in primary education and basic medical health.
151 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 133), pp. 15, 17. The more compre-
hensive “Rural Development Strategy” was to be completed by 2001, but as yet there is only a draft ex-
tant. The same applies to the district-specific PRSP, previously announced for spring 2003.
152 The United Republic of Tanzania, Progress Report..., op. cit. (note 137), p. 20.
153 This has come about against the background of an unchanged, restrictive fiscal policy which, with the
inclusion of grants from development co-operation, envisages a budget deficit in the region of only –1 to
–0.5% of GDP.
154 Hanfstängl, Wie wirkt sich der HIPC-II-Schuldenerlass ..., op. cit. (note 142), p. 6.
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day. It was not only that this party knew how to exploit its dominant position prior to the
elections, it also managed to profit from the fact that the opposition parties were weak,
fragmented and rather artificial creations.155 And so the CCM candidate, Benjamin Mkapa,
received 61.8% of the votes in the 1995 presidential elections and in 2000 managed to
acquire 71.1% while his party in the 1995 parliamentary elections secured 78.1%, and in
2000 there was a similar increase to bring in 89% of all the parliamentary seats. However,
this result, which reminds one of the formal one-party rule, cannot solely be attributed to
the dominant power position of the CCM and its rigorous methods. The fact that, con-
trary to neighbouring states like Zambia and Kenya, no relevant opposition has come into
being up to now is much more a consequence of the fact that the CCM, unlike in any
other state in Africa, has managed to penetrate and integrate the country. Yet stability and
stagnation have gone hand in hand with one another. As – paradoxical – result the rule of
one party in the country has brought about astonishing acceptance among the electorate
which, at the same time, has certainly insisted on the right of political participation. It was
therefore relatively easy to control this genuine process of democratisation from
“above”.156 On the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, however, political tensions are much
more marked, and after the chaotic course of the last elections at the turn of the millen-
nium, 2000/01, these found their expression in bloody demonstrations.
These characteristics of the Tanzanian political system may well explain why explicit
acknowledgement of democracy is lacking in the PRSP and why concrete measures for the
improvement of governance are scant. On the one hand, both the IMF and World Bank
pointedly note in their evaluation that governance is an important element in the PRSP,
since “poor people stress the importance of improving governance to help reduce their
vulnerability and insecurity”.157 And indeed the social groups debating the PRSP in the
“zonal workshops” had complained that poor governance was one of their most serious
grievances at least at local level. On the other hand, the IMF and World Bank rightly raise
the issue that plans in this regard such as the “National Anti-Corruption Strategy and
Action Plan” from 1997 had found no echo in the PRSP. Although the subject of corrup-
tion has become a widely discussed topic in Tanzania, in practice not much has happened
to change things, which may also point to the specifically African “double talk” where a
problem is openly proclaimed and yet precisely in this way is talked into something insig-
nificant. At the same time there have been further initiatives and progress since the adop-
tion of the PRSP, which are detailed in the Progress Report.158
155 Cf. here “Economic Reforms and Democratisation in Tanzania: the case of the elections 2000 and the
need to go beyond electionalism.” Paper to the conference on “Democratisation and Conflict Manage-
ment in West Africa”, February 28 – March 3, 2002, p. 10.
156 Cf. here Gero Erdmann, Die tansanische Art der Demokratisierung, in: Habari, no. 4, 2000, in:
www.tanzania-network.de.
157 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 133), p. 7.
158 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP – Progress Report. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 139), p. 2; The United
Republic of Tanzania, Progress Report..., op. cit. (note 137), pp. 4, 11, 34. Tanzania thus ranges in the In-
dex of Corruption of Transparency International after a short improvement still in tenth place from the
bottom just ahead of Kenya and Uganda.
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As far as concrete measures in the interests of good governance are concerned, the re-
form and strengthening of the judiciary has been mentioned and the intention of en-
trusting local officials with the responsibility of carrying out social services. In this way,
and in compliance with the efforts at decentralisation launched in 1999, local administra-
tions have been charged with the tasks of education, health, water supply, roads, agricul-
ture and social development in general the kernel of the struggle against poverty. Not only
this reminds one of the Bolivian example. The PRSP also lays emphasis on the desire to
involve the poor in the planning and extension of development policies during the course
of “Local Government reforms”.159 Although the IMF and World Bank have voiced no
objections in principle, they nevertheless note (and not without reason) that the shift of
authority requires “appropriate monitoring and accountability mechanisms to ensure the
proper and effective use of resources”. In strong contrast to Bolivia, there were no initia-
tives in the matter of decentralisation and “social control” at hand. Therefore, the IFI in
conjunction with the fears of Tanzanian NGOs, entertain doubt about whether there is
sufficient readiness and resolution to implement the PRSP at local level.160 Thus one can
read in the evaluation of the first Progress Report the complaint that there is “a gap be-
tween good policy measures under the local government reform program, and the im-
plementation of these reforms on the ground”161
In as far as the IMF and World Bank have drawn attention to matters of public ad-
ministration, it is the classical, technocratically applied themes of governance as these
were typical for the second generation of structural adjustment. Along with the war on
corruption, there is also tax reform as well as the implementation of budgetary policies,
the improvement of the conditions for private business and, finally, the restructuring and
privatisation of public utilities.162 This may well serve the interests of the market, but it
may in no way support democracy. In this, the demand for participation promised to
prove a corrective, but in this area, too, experience is at best a mixed affair.
4.2.3. Participation and Ownership: Contradictory Interpretations
According to the views of the IMF and World Bank, the drafting of the Tanzanian PRSP
was rooted in a “broad-based participation of civil society”.163 Those taking part in it, nev-
159 The United Republic of Tanzania, PRSP..., op. cit. (note 135), p. 20. The reform of local administration
has begun in 1999, when 35 “pilot districts” were started and should be completed in 2004. The legal
preconditions seem successively to have been created since 1997.
160 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint Staff Assessment ..., op. cit. (note 133), pp. 9.
161 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP – Progress Report, Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 139), p. 2. In the
second “Progress Report” the Tanzanian government itself complains of the fact that the local represen-
tatives lack necessary “capacity” in managing the infrastructure in this case. The United Republic of
Tanzania, The Second Progress Report..., op. cit. (note 140), p. 33.
162 IMF, IDA, Tanzania Completion Point Document ..., op. cit. (note 138), pp. 8-11. Without regard for the
demonstratively proposed intention to limit itself to its core competencies, the IMF within the frame-
work of the PRGF negotiations in 2001confirmed its – conditional – demands for the privatisation of the
water suppliers DAWASA – as well as the demand to allow foreign portfolio investments.
163 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 133), p. 1.
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ertheless, see the matter quite differently: “However, this rhetoric misrepresents, or covers
up, the truth” – thus Rebecca Muna from the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Develop-
ment (TCDD) which, together with OXFAM has actively entered the discussion process
with its own workshops and papers.164 In fact, we are concerned here with a consultation
process working under time pressure with inadequate preparation and limited effect after
the setting up of the interim PRSP found no participation at all. NGO representatives
among others complained that the process was conducted in a “superficial and half-
hearted manner”, that they were inadequately involved in discussion, were not in posses-
sion of sufficient information, remained dependent on unofficial sources and, added to
this, could not find adequate expression to contribute to the conclusions of the docu-
ment.165 This criticism corresponds with most experiences in the first PRSP generation to
which, in an evaluation, the IMF generally observed that “there was limited civil society
participation in policy formulation.”166
The most important instrument in the process of “civil society” participation were
seven “zonal workshops” in May, 2000 during which the so-called “grassroots
stakeholders” were asked about their opinions. Altogether, 804 people took part in this
“workshopping approach to participation”, as they were sarcastically called. 167 These, re-
spectively, were randomly selected village inhabitants (four per district), one district MP,
a district executive director, a councillor and five NGO representatives per district. There
were working groups and finally a plenary meeting. The subjects discussed were the defi-
nition, features and indicators with respect to poverty as well as the determination of pri-
orities as far as tasks and measures were concerned. The PRSP maintains that by far the
most important tasks identified were the issues of education and training, followed by
agriculture, health, traffic, infrastructure and water supplies. The following problem areas
were specifically listed: “poor governance” (also more than 50%, specifically a lack of
transparency and accountability in particular at the local level, inadequate financing of
key sectors in the struggle against poverty), cultural, social and gender factors, illiteracy,
inadequate traffic infrastructure and finally, agricultural problems such as inadequate
market access for agricultural goods as well as the lack of seed and insufficient financing.
In June, 2000, a meeting with the donor community and with participation of the IMF
and the World Bank took place, and later another in which MPs were also present. During
both, the zonal workshop proposals were considered. The upshot was the formation of a
“National Workshop” in August of the same year comprising 25 participants where, next
164 Rebecca Muna, Civil Society Participation in the PRSP. A Case Study of Tanzania, in: www.tanzania-
network.de (accessed 2003-05-19).
165 Ibid.; cf. also “The new face of IMF structural adjustment (Tanzania)”, June 2000, in: www.nadir.org
(accessed 2003-05-19); “United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Contribution to
the World Bank&IMF PRSP Review”, November 26, 2001, in: www.worldbank.org (accessed 2003-05-
19).
166 Caroline M. Robb, Allison M. Scott, Reviewing Early Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in Africa, IMF
Policy Discussion Paper PDP/01/5, November 2001, pp. 19, 25-31.
167 “The new face…”, op. cit. (note 165).
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to representatives of the Central and Regional governments, again the donors, interna-
tional organizations, private business, NGOs, media and representatives of the so-called
“informal sector” also took part in order to discuss the first draft of the PRSP. Comple-
mentary themes such as unemployment and in particular juvenile and urban unemploy-
ment, child labour, financing of small farmer and small businesses as well as a generally
supportive environment for the private sector were brought up for consideration.168
Altogether, participation did not achieve much more than that both sides got to know
each other. However, with regard to the firm reservations of the NGOs, it has to be
pointed out that in a society which has for decades been marked by a one-party rulership
of socialist orientation, Tanzania must first develop a vital culture of debate so that prog-
ress comes about only gradually, though continually. Further, it may not be overlooked
that many of the NGOs present themselves as little more than the means of perceiving the
very personal interests of their founders, interests which manifest themselves as main-
taining the goodwill of their foreign donors – a problem which is all too familiar in other
parts of the world.169 This relativises the number of 9000 NGOs which have arisen up until
1999. For the most part located in Dar es Salaam, they owe their very existence not only to
democratisation, but also to the circumstance that the state in accordance with the donor
community has transferred many social services to this sector.170
In setting up the two Progress Reports, an enlargement of participation did not seem
necessary – “based on the assumption that the concerns and views of the poor have not
changed significantly from those documented recently in the zonal workshops and de-
scribed in the original PRSP”.171 Nevertheless, the first Progress Report lists a number of
specific tasks entrusted to the “domestic stakeholders“, the representatives of the poor, the
“civil society” and the private sector. These are: (1) Consultation on sector-specific strate-
gies, (2) zonal workshops and the participatory evaluation of poverty in order, where nec-
essary, to change the focus of the PRSP, (3) the evaluation of PRSP drafts in special
workshops, (4) participation in the meetings of the “Consultative Group” with the donor
community.172 There are not only indications of a consolidation, but also prospects for the
institutionalisation of future participation. Such a transformation of the “consultative
exercises undertaken during the formulation of the PRSP into a fully institutionalised and
sustainable process of public accountability” has already been suggested by the IMF and
World Bank with “poverty monitoring” in mind.173 And indeed, the second Progress Re-
port demonstrates that considerable progress has been made in the creation of a “Poverty
Monitoring System”. In this way, and with the participation of a “wide range of
168 The United Republic of Tanzania, PRSP..., op. cit. (note 135), pp. 4f and Annex 1.
169 Cf. Hanfstängl, Wie wirkt sich der HIPC-II-Schuldenerlass..., op. cit. (note 142), p. 5. For a general criti-
cism, see also Chung, Ottaway, op. cit. (note 33).
170 Cf. “Economic Reforms...”, op. cit. (note 155), p. 13.
171 The United Republic of Tanzania, Progress Report..., op. cit. (note 137), p. 2.
172 Ibid.
173 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 133), p. 6.
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stakeholders”, four technical working groups were set up which were to be concerned
with poverty analysis as well as the circulation of relevant plans within the country.174
Apparently in this case the government – contrary to the first PRSP – took demands
from society seriously. Thus, in April, 2001, the “Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Devel-
opment” once more organised a parallel workshop, an occasion on which it reiterated that
the former proposals had found no echo in the PRSP and that, for this reason, the NGOs
wished to develop their own monitoring system.175 However, one could get the impression
that the government is in favour of engaging NGOs, above all in those areas where it is
indispensable in the successful fight against poverty, that is, in the identification of the
phenomenon as well as the mobilisation of the necessary personnel in their daily contact
with those affected. Yet in the matter of monitoring budget appropriations and expenses
there are no institutionalised precautions which signal effective participation. At the same
time it is a recognisable fact that in the combination of calls for participation from with-
out and the readiness for change from within certainly embody chances for further de-
mocratisation.
There are extremely varying views as to the second element, that is ownership. Ac-
cording to the IFI, the PRSP process in Tanzania did not only run its course with partici-
pation, but was, in addition, “strongly owned domestically”, and had contributed greatly
to the strengthening of poverty reducing measures.176 Critical observers – as in Bolivia –
are much more cautious, and their views much more differentiated. An extensive study on
the part of the ODI thus states on the institutionalisation of the PRSP process in Tanzania:
“[O]wnership of the rhetoric of PRSPs is not the same as political commitment to the PRSP
approach. In Tanzania, political commitment exists at the very top but it dilutes as one goes
down the political hierarchy. Building that commitment from the bottom is as important as
securing it at the top. In the end the test for the PRSP may not be the quality of the strategy
per se, but the degree to which it becomes a platform for doing things differently.”177
174 At the centre of research activities will be the up to now unsolved questions of “vulnerability”, of the
“Macro-Micro Linkages” as well as poverty in the urban regions. The work group responsible for the
dissemination of the PRSP had in 2002 set up a simplified version of the first “Progress Reports” and had
also set up and published a guideline to monitoring. As an activity in the interests of popularising the
new strategy, the Second Progress Report further pointed to the “Poverty Policy Week” in September
2002 that is planned to appear annually to provide a more formal forum for “stakeholders’ participation
in the national dialogue”. Cf. The United Republic of Tanzania, The Second Progress Report..., op. cit.
(note 140), pp. VIII, 73f. This, however, contains much more substance than the hitherto rather ritualis-
tic pronouncements on the part of the Tanzanian government, that it had applied participatory begin-
nings three years before the PRSP in arranging development strategies.
175 Cf. TCDD, The Report on Civil Society Workshop on Poverty/PRSP Monitoring Skills, Dar es Salaam, April
4-6, 2001, p. 7.
176 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP – Progress Report. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 139), p. 7. The “Com-
pletion Point Document” even emphasises that PRSP “has become fully owned in-country”; IMF, IDA,
Tanzania. Completion Point Document..., op. cit. (note 138), p. 6.
177 ODI (ed.), PRSP Institutionalisation Study: Final Report. Chapter 9 – Institutionalising the PRSP ap-
proach in Tanzania. Submitted to the Strategic Partnership with Africa, August 30, 2001, p. IX.
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And a further NGO study on the implementation of the PRSP laconically notes that Tan-
zania’s PRSP was “country-led but not country owned”.178 With the same effect, repre-
sentatives of the non-governmental organisations criticise on principal grounds that, on
the contrary, the PRSP undermined its declared objective, in that it accorded the interna-
tional financial institutions as a final authority an unseemly large – indeed unprecedented
– influence, since “[n]ever before have the IMF and the World Bank possessed the power
to endorse a borrower’s entire national plan, such as the PRSP.”179 Such fundamental criti-
cism is certainly exaggerated, because there has been regular complaint that the “excessive
levels of conditionality” in the business of according credit – even with the HIPC debt
relief there were twenty conditions attached – “amounts to micro-management of the
Government of Tanzania by its creditors”.180 This formerly much higher number is in-
tended to be cut back in the framework of the PRSP. Furthermore, in the course of devel-
opmental co-operation, the “micro-management” of project aid is to be replaced by a
global budget assistance on the basis of a PRSP and this, of course, requires a mutually
agreed strategy. It is therefore of great importance to know whether and in what form the
postulates of participation and ownership are actually and materially reflected in the eco-
nomic growth concepts which were once referred to as structural adjustment. However,
the PRSP process has up to now only left the slightest traces of influence in this domaine
reservée of the Washington financial institutions as can be shown as much for Tanzania as
for Bolivia.
A highly dubious thesis from the IMF and the World Bank whose presentation is no-
where to be found in the Tanzanian PRSP, is that the discussions among those concerned
with the zonal workshops “indicated a broad consensus on the priority of accelerating
economic growth, and on the ongoing agenda of structural reforms as the main tool for
poverty reduction.”181 Quite to the contrary, the most vehement criticism on the part of
the NGOs was that the macro-economic objectives as well as individual structural reforms
were not made part of the consultation process and, as in the past, were not open to the
public, but a matter of negotiation between the IFI and the Tanzanian government.182 At
this point, Tanzania fits in perfectly with the general experience of PRSP processes. In the
case of Tanzania, there could be the added difficulty that within the political system, the
processes of decision making do not only run on “centralistic” and hierarchical lines, but
that all development issues in the past have been negotiated in an “iron triangle” whose
sides are formed by the president, his finance minister and the donor community.183
178 Christopher Mwakasege (TASOET), The Tanzanian experience of implementing PRSP for the first two
years. An NGO Perspective, December 2002, in: www.tasoet.org (accessed 2003-05-19).
179 Muna, op. cit. (note 164)
180 “Year 2000…”, op. cit. (note 87), p. 14.
181 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 133), p. 2.
182 Cf. e.g. “Year 2000...”, op. cit. (note 87), p. 2.
183 Cf. “Economic Reforms...”, op. cit. (note 155), p. 5. At any rate, one of the most massive interventions of
the IFI took place within this triangle when, after the exposure of a corruption scandal in the finance
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The continuity of the main tenets of economic policy is clear: “[S]ubstantial further
progress toward a market-based economy and movement away from the previous reliance
on control mechanisms and government ownership of the means of production” present
basic premisses of the PRSP.184 And IMF and World Bank emphasise that the current
macro-economic and structural reforms make up the “core of the PRS”. At the same time,
the IFI return criticism of this programme to the Tanzanian government and complain
that the connection to poverty reduction has received too little attention, and that the
paper concentrated too intensely on “poverty-specific reforms”. It goes on: “Nonetheless,
the staffs would urge the authorities, as they prepare the first annual report on the imple-
mentation of the PRS, to emphasize the broader macro-economic and structural reform
context.”185 Yet nothing really changed in the first Progress Report as the IMF and World
Bank notice in their criticism: “In this context, the next report should provide a more
thorough discussion of monetary and external sector policies, as well as the role of the
financial sector in the poverty reduction strategy.186 However, an “impact analysis” has not
been conducted either, and the “macro-micro linkages” for the time being belong to the
“unsolved questions”.
In Tanzania, too, the “macro-economic framework” thus determines the space for
participation and ownership. Certainly, the PRSP has demonstrated that the targeted de-
ployment of limited means can bring partial success and obviate negative trends. School-
ing, for example, reached earlier levels of performance in the shortest time. Whether this
signalises an enduring trend will have to remain open for the time being, but considering
the profound financial bottlenecks, some doubt is in order. At other places, though, and
in the course of structural adjustment, problems have come to a head and, as a result,
have provided a good deal of potential conflict. Thus the granting of privilege to superior
foreign capital conceals the very real hazard of almost all the dynamic sectors of Tanza-
nian economy being taken over by persons whose interests lie outside the country. This,
under the slogan of “indigenisation”, has already released nationalistic reflexes. Promoted
to some extent by the government itself, it has begun to build up resistance against an all
administration in 1994 under the then president, Mwinyi, they demanded the resignation of his finance
minister, see Hanfstängl, Wie wirkt sich der HIPC-II-Schuldenerlass..., op. cit. (note 142), p. 7.
184 Tanzania, Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, op. cit. (note 146), pp. 1f. In this way up to the end of
2001, two thirds of the 400 Parastatals were privatised. Reform of the civil service led to a reduction of
personnel from 355,000 to 270,000. And finally, there were singular preferences for foreign investors,
which, according to the Investor’s Guide to East Africa, received contributions to invested capital to the
tune of 25 to 100%, an unlimited repatriation of profits, custom-free imports of manufactured goods,
tax holidays and, of course, freedom from expropriation. Cf. The summary in Hanfstängl, Wie wirkt sich
der HIPC-II-Schuldenerlass..., op. cit. (note 142), p. 7.
185 IMF, IDA, Tanzania PRSP. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 133), p.6, 11.
186 IMF, IFA, Tanzania PRSP – Progress Report. Joint Staff Assessment..., op. cit. (note 139), p. 5. The same
demands are to be seen in a first general evaluation paper on the PRSP process from the IMF. In it, the
authors miss impact analyses on the poor of the abolition of subsidies or exchange rate changes as well as
of structural reforms such as liberalisation or reform of the civil service. Robb, Scott, op. cit. (note 166),
p. 19.
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too ubiquitous – in this particular case – South African presence.187 Another problem is
presented by the high number of unemployed and the growth of social inequality in the
urban centres – especially in Dar es Salaam – which is not only a consequence of rural
stagnation and the high birth rate, but also of the wave of lay-offs in the wake of privatisa-
tion. In agriculture, too, the hopes that productivity would increase through liberalisation
and privatisation have been dashed by raised prices and reduced market access. All these
problems are mentioned succinctly in the PRSP but no more yet.
5. Lessons learned?
The new strategy to eradicate poverty inherent in the modest term, PRSP, unites the
strong and the weak elements which distinguish some of the not so infrequent changes of
course in development policy. As both a key principle and concept, PRSP embodies a far-
reaching transformation which opens up no less sweeping chances. Its implementation on
the other hand all too clearly reflects the political and social realities of the developing
world as well as the degree of persistence of those national and international institutions
who have made it their goal to significantly improve these.
This is true especially for those aspects which occupy a central place in this report –
participation and ownership and the promotion of democracy. With the introduction of
PRSP, these receive the rank of integral parts of, and necessary conditions for overcoming
the social and economic deficiencies manifested by persistent poverty. Thus the develop-
ing countries should finally enter the “driver’s seat” – this means, ownership. In addition,
not the political elites alone, but society as a whole and especially those affected by poverty
should be responsible for the means and goals of development; this means participation.
Both, namely, require a minimum of democratic rights, freedom of expression and, ide-
ally, a political order in which competition can operate in a free and fair way, where the
rule of law and an impartial judicial system secure civil rights, and guarantee institutional
free play.
After only three years, experience has shown that those noble intentions have not yet
found their way into political reality. This alone would not have been worth mentioning
had it not also been for the fact that their implementation has illuminated inconsistencies,
contradictions and restrictions which are quite qualified to throw doubt on the concept as
a whole. This affects the PRSP concept itself as put into practice by its creators, the IMF
and World Bank. In addition, it affects the bilateral donors inasmuch as they are expected
to fit their national concepts into new frames of reference. Both require a considerable
187 Cf. the contribution of Rolf Hofmeier on Tanzania in the Africa Year Book 1999, published by Institut
für Afrika-Kunde (Rolf Hofmeier/Cord Jakobeit), Opladen (Leske+Budrich), 2000, p. 324, and also Af-
rica-Year Book 2000, p. 323. At the privatisation of the “Parastatals” only 14 larger concerns completely
passed into foreign hands (albeit the larger ones) and 122 into indigenous; cf. Africa Year Book 2001,
p. 341.
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ability to adapt without allowing the new strategy to suffer the fate of its numerous prede-
cessors and get dashed to pieces on the rocks of great intentions and small accomplish-
ments or between morality and self-interest.
What concerns the weakness in implementing the PRSP concept, it may be hesitation
and insecurity at the beginning, that participation up to now is to be exclusively equated
with consultation of organised social groups – in its most narrow sense. In this respect,
IMF and World Bank have adopted an attitude of reserve. While their declared intentions
have been to suggest clear conditions as to form and content of participation – since alleg-
edly effective poverty reduction is only possible through broad participation on the basis
of democratic conditions – they still assign governments considerable liberties to do what
they like. In the matter of economic conditions, however, where the PRSP concept sug-
gests specific national solutions, the promised flexibility is up to now still not forthcom-
ing. At any rate, in the documented cases at least the organised part of society clearly ex-
pressed themselves in the elaboration of PRSP, which can certainly be evaluated as a con-
tribution to political empowerment and, as such, also to democratisation. Inasmuch as
social mobilisation and participation processes are brought into action, we can assert that
the PRSP initiative has, as a result, directly and indirectly, allowed democratic effects to
unfold.
Yet, NGOs have complained that participation concerning strategic decisions of the
political executive to the PRSP were restricted to a minimum and demand not only a
consultative seat, but also a vote. This objection is just as worthy of consideration as it is
problematical as far as democratic theory goes, since it can contribute to the erosion of
democratic processes when diffuse, decentralised dialogue and control take the place of
representative institutions.188 It is hardly a matter of coincidence that participation of par-
liamentary bodies in setting up the PRSPs have remained essentially reduced to a mini-
mum, despite the fact that these as national development plans considerably prejudice
budget decisions, and thus intervene appreciably in classical parliamentary prerogative. In
the end, an expansion of social control mechanisms which would coincide with the in-
creasing organisation and co-ordination of social groups will only in the course of
strengthening and democratising state authority at all levels contribute to the evolution
and strengthening of democracy. Otherwise, it would only provide leeway for tactical
finesse on the part of the central government and also extend the possibilities for individ-
ual, well organized “partners” at the non-governmental level to wield their influence,
something which would reinforce the paternal or clientelist structures in different guises
which, with the help of participation, are to be overcome.
As positive as the demand for participation is, as important are the kind and the degree
of its realisation since otherwise “Phoney participation processes can undermine demo-
cratic processes as much as autocratic processes do”. This concerns the domestic side of
188 The ODI speaks of a “gap between the central policymaking fora (which often include formal civil soci-
ety organisations) and decentralised, often informal, participatory processes”. ODI, Experience with Pov-
erty Reduction Strategies..., op. cit. (note 89), p. 6.
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participation; however, there is also an external which has been sarcastically summed up
in the observation, “I participate, you participate, he/she participates, we participate, you
participate and THEY decide.”189 With that, probably the most important limitation of the
implementation of PRSP is addressed, since although massive criticism has been levelled
at the neo-liberal structural adjustment policy on the part of global “civil society”, it finds
its continuation almost undiminished in PRSPs – regardless of all participation.
This experience has led to the conviction of many NGOs that, as stated by Charles
Abugre, “participation is only directed at ‘engineering consent’ to the subtle dictates of
creditors”. In other words, that participation is only acceptable inasmuch “it does not
interfere with serious matters of macro-economic and structural policies”.190 A sceptical
interpretation of this would be that PRSP is little more than the tactical answer to the
recognition that classical structural adjustment and stabilisation policies no longer allow
themselves to be imposed upon. Accordingly, participation, under the control of national
executives, is essentially concerned with anchoring the Washington Consensus in society,
whereas the “over-arching” objective to eradicate poverty provides the orthodox eco-
nomic and political growth maxims with a trace of legitimacy. And, in practical terms, the
PRSP – whatever the differences in detail – confines itself to using available resources
from the HPIC debt relief for social measures in the interests of the poor – controlled by
social groups and external “development partners” in the framework of the consultation
process.191 Yet, this basic criticism unintentionally reveals that PRSP processes just do not
function simply as legitimation endeavours of the IFI, but, on the contrary, provide de-
bates in society with new starting points and new leeway. The more frequently the IMF
and World Bank paint “democratic principles” on their flags, the more they will be meas-
ured at these and acknowledge the cleft between declaration and practice.
This in particular applies to the rules of the IFI, to give the “country owned” strategy
papers the last – and deciding – stamps of approval, so that these in conditions of ex-
panded participatory rights may remain on the path of Washington virtue. This is justifi-
able, though not legitimate – even when, of course, it cannot be demanded of any donor
that he give the taxpayers’ money away solely in keeping with the demands of the recipi-
189 Alexander, Park, op. cit. (note 150).
190 Abugre, op. cit. (note 58), p. 22. An example of recent US policy with regard to Bolivia may clarify the
limited effectiveness of the democratisation paradigm: when, after the second round of the Bolivian
elections, the indigenous leader of the Coca farmers and a sharp critic of neo-liberal reforms, Evo Mora-
les, came in second just behind Sánchez de Lozada, in the deciding ballot, the US ambassador in the
country made it unequivocally clear that the election of Morales would jeopardize US financial support.
See, Michael Shifter, Latin America’s New Political Leaders: Walking on a Wire, in: Current History, vol.
102, no. 661, February 2003, p. 57; Tim Padgett, Letter from Bolivia: Taking the Side of The Coca
Farmer, in: CNN.com, July 29, 2002, www.cnn.com (accessed 2003-05-12).
191 That this can also be positive for the poor in the affected countries is not to be denied. However, there is
a considerable difference as to whether the PRSP initiative is merely hovering in the wings of a conven-
tional macro-economic programme via a poverty orientated and participatory use of HIPC resources, or
whether, with the help of the instruments of participation, it is serving to bring about a comprehensive
strategic re-orientation of national and international development policies.
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ents. In order to offer justification and at the same time provide the PRSP concept with a
better raison d’être, there is a conceivable alternative in that the donor community as
whole accepts the strategy papers. This would help to strengthen the weak negotiation
position of developing countries, and accord greater weight to pluralism on the part of the
donors. In this sense it has been suggested to place the PRSP for endorsement before the
donors at a round table.192 The respective donor conferences as an already existing institu-
tion present themselves as a possibility here.
A further dimension of donor interference is presented by the conditionalities which,
as in the past, are attached to funding by the IMF and World Bank and which claim valid-
ity for all donors. Although the “micro-management” of the developing countries has
come to an end with the introduction of PRSP, it does not suffice to merely reduce the
number of conditions. The inherent conflict between ownership and externally imposed
conditions might be more convincingly allayed by modifying their form and character. A
flexible, country specific ex post conditionality to be pruned to the absolutely essential
would in any case be much more compliant with the declared intentions of the PRSP ini-
tiative.193 The same applies to prescribed procedural conditions affecting basic standards
for participation, for example. In contrast to the classical economic conditions those do
not yet exist. In order to take the varying pre-conditions for the participatory process in
developing countries into account, the donors – in dialogue with official and non-
governmental groups and in a transparent decision making process – could thus con-
ceivably lay down objectives specific to the country in question to which external support
can then be bound.194
Regardless of the indicated modifications, the future of the PRSP concepts will depend
on the donors and their readiness to follow the goals and priorities of the new strategy in
their bilateral development co-operation. Above all, this will demand turning away from
192 Cf. EURODAD, PRSP – The Story So Far..., op. cit. (note 58), p. 2; Walter Eberlei, “An der Spitze der
Armutsbekämpfer, Weltbank und Währungsfonds machen Tempo bei der Umsetzung ihrer neuen
Strategie”, in: epd Entwicklungspolitik, no. 3, February 2000, p. 16.
193 Ex post conditionality is orientated to results and not to individual policy measures; cf. Angela Wood,
Comments on the IMF staff’s review of conditionality, Bretton Woods Project, April 2001,
www.brettonwoodsproject.org (accessed 2002-08-15), p. 7. Bevan und Adam mean by the term ex post
conditionality a concept “where donors would no longer seek to ‘buy’ specific policy choices, but rather
would provide support to countries whose policy regimes were, in some general sense, deemed condu-
cive to sustainable poverty-reducing growth. Under this view the provision of policy advice from donors
and IFIs would be ‘unbundled’ from the provision of finance, creating more space for recipients to de-
velop their own programmes.” David L. Bevan, Christopher S. Adam, Poverty Reduction Strategies and
Macroeconomic Policy Framework, Draft Guidance Note, University of Oxford, July 26, 2000, www. glob
alisation.gov.uk/BackgroundWord/PovertyReductionStrategiesDavidBevan.doc (accessed 2003-06-13),
p. 22.
194 Procedural conditions ought to be made flexible and clearly formulated as Molenaers and Renard, op.
cit. (note 88), emphasise. They argue “that participation as imposed by donors, is at the same time too
ambitious to be workable and too vague to be monitored”, and that is why “the participation condition-
ality should be ‘contextualized’ in the sense of being modelled to the specific history and institutional
context of every country”; ibid., p. 5.
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the currently practised, conventional, project hampered aid, and in its place implement
direct budget aid to help realise PRSP objectives. This kind of re-thinking which can be
viewed as a minimal condition to give substance to ownership and participation has pro-
gressed at a different speed. Bolivia, for example, is generally thought to be a “good exam-
ple of better donor coordination”195 and according to the BMZ, bi- and multilateral do-
nors are “unanimous about the distinct improvement of donor co-ordination with regard
to the PRS process.”196 This came out of the “Nuevo Marco de Relaciamiento” (New Rela-
tions Framework), published in 1999, which forms the framework for agreements be-
tween the Bolivian government and the donors. In Tanzania, this corresponds to the
“Tanzania Assistance Strategy” from the same year. The donor co-ordination continues to
run via the “Bolivia Consultative Group” whose annual meetings no longer take place in
Paris, but in La Paz – a symbolic reference to ownership.
After the bilateral donors (via a fund administrated by UNDP) had participated in the
financing of the national dialogues, they have now organised into four working groups to
support the PRSP.197 This, too, signalised the weight they placed in their policy on the
Bolivian PRSP. Thus a new “country strategy paper” of the European Commission was
launched in May, 2002, “that fully backs the PRSP and aspires to promote sector-wide
working within the ‘New Relations Framework’”.198 The same is true for bilateral co-
operation. For instance, the Netherlands and Bolivia have identified three sectors for
budgetary aid (education, decentralisation and agricultural development), and the British
DFID supports specific PRSP objectives such as “pro-poor growth, social inclusion, par-
ticipatory governance” both via the government (mainly in the form of budgetary aid)
and via “civil society” initiatives.199 According to the BMZ, Germany too plans to adopt
“the PRS process as a starting point” for its future priority funding, and has already par-
ticipated in a number of “basket funding” activities in Bolivia.200 The GTZ refers to this no
195 ODI, Experience with Poverty Reduction Strategies, op. cit. (note 89), p. 14.
196 BMZ, Deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Bolivien (Deutsche Beteiligung an PRS-Prozessen),
Summary, May 7, 2003, www.bmz.de (accessed 2003-05-21).
197 These are: “Sustainability of the PRSP” (macro-economic policies, HIPC, and market access), co-
ordinated by IMF und EU; “Implementation and Monitoring of the PRSP” (public investments, Boliv-
ian CDF, National Dialogue, social control), co-ordinated by the Netherlands; “Institutionality“ (anti-
corruption, rule of law, state modernisation), co-ordinated by Denmark and UNDP; “Participation and
Social Integration”, co-ordinated by UNDP. In addition Spain, the UN Drug Control Program and the
EU are active members of the USAID-led “Alternative Development Donor Group”; cf. USAID, Bolivia,
www.usaid.gov/country/lac/bo (accessed 2003-03-18).
198 ODI, Experience with Poverty Reduction Strategies ..., op. cit. (note 89), p. 11. The Country Strategy Paper
is to be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/bolivia/csp/index.htm.
199 Ibid., p. 12, Box 4.
200 BMZ, Deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Bolivien, op. cit. (note 196). Among others, it partici-
pates (together with the World Bank and other bilateral donors) in a programme for institutional re-
form and (together with UNDP and numerous bilateral donors) in a basket for the support of an om-
budsman (Defensoria del Pueblo). Cf. BMZ, Harmonisierung von Geberpraktiken in der deutschen
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, in: www.bmz.de (accessed 2003-05-22).
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less as a “primary concern [...] to improve the institutional and organisational precondi-
tions for the implementation of the Bolivian reforms and political poverty reduction.”201
The development policies of the USA, however, have not yet shown an inclination to
adjust to the Bolivian poverty reduction strategy. USAID’s emphasis is on supporting the
Bolivian democracy as well as anti-drug operations.202 This fits in with the policies of the
Bush Administration which is contemplating a “revolution in foreign assistance” not
through PRSP but its “Millennium Challenge Account”. This new programme, however,
only awards aid to that very small number of best performing countries that meet the
criteria of “ruling justly, investing in their people and encouraging economic freedom”.203
It is up to the Peace Corps and the remaining donors to look after matters of the rest.
However, the German government too arouses doubt when it is maintained that Ger-
man development co-operation needs only “small adjustments, because of the PRSP pro-
cess”, since “all its programmes and projects are to be found in the Bolivian PRSP and
have been orientated to reducing poverty anyway”.204 In view of the numerous changes of
course in development policy, rhetorical adjustments certainly belong to the most popular
exercises of a bureaucracy bent on continuity. The instrument of “basket financing”, for
instance, which plays a central role in the bilateral development co-operation as far as
Bolivia is concerned, is in no way an innovation – and the existent “baskets” can be easily
given new titles and assigned to the new PRS areas. Claiming coherence in such a way
while at the same time maintaining continuity in programme and project aid, leads the
PRSP initiative, with its emphasis on participation and ownership, simply ad absurdum.
Why set up a national poverty strategy under laborious conditions involving dialogue and
tedious negotiation if (not only) the German development policy is already familiar with
priorities and needs?
Yet an unusually frank BMZ internal evaluation of Tanzania indicates that the PRSP
concept represents quite a challenge to the conduct of German development co-
201 Cf. GTZ, Countries: Bolivia, www.gtz.de/laender (accessed 2003-03-18). Explicitly the GTZ refers to its
support of the PRSP implementation since January, 2002 within the framework of the programme:
„Dezentrale Regierungsführung zur Unterstützung der nationalen Armutsbekämpfungsstrategie“
(PADEP).
202 The following are valid as development objectives: “nurturing and institutionalising democratic princi-
ples, providing opportunities to increase the incomes of the poor, improving the health of Bolivians,
protecting the environment, and promoting alternative development.” USAID, Bolivia, op. cit. (note
197). As a matter of general principle, the Bush Administration places its accents in a rather traditional
cut which show little readiness to orientate itself to PRSP: “The key to raising living standards and re-
ducing poverty around the world is increasing productivity growth, especially in the poorest countries.
We will continue to press the multilateral development banks to focus on activities that increase eco-
nomic productivity, such as improvements in education, health, rule of law, and private sector develop-
ment. Every project, every loan, every grant must be judged by how it will increase productivity growth
in developing countries.” The White House (ed.), The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, Washington, D.C., September 2002, p. 22.
203 Testimony of Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, USAID, On the Millennium Challenge Account,
March, 6, 2003, www.usaid.gov/press/spe_test/testimony/2003/ty030306.html (accessed 2003-05-23).
204 BMZ, Deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Bolivien, op. cit. (note 196).
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operation. It can be taken as being of general relevance, since the BMZ, along with classi-
cal individual projects, also has projects which are explicitly assigned to the PRSP in Tan-
zania.205 In the evaluation of March, 2003, we read that “the contribution of the German
development co-operation to the PRS in Tanzania is as yet in its beginnings” and that
Germany has not contributed to the drafting of the PRSP. According to evaluation this
derives from the fact that Germany’s development co-operation still rests on individual
projects tailored to country strategies elaborated by the German authorities. As a conse-
quence and in contrast to many other donors, “only first steps” were recognisable. Yet
PRSP, it went on, required “complex adjustments” or something akin to a “thorough re-
construction of the German development co-operation”.206 This corresponds much more
with Tanzania’s complaint in its PRSP, that “substantial efforts toward poverty reduction
by international partners are still being implemented outside the framework of the central
Government budget”, whereby “specific donor-driven projects” are especially promi-
nent.207 The readiness to leave well-beaten paths will decide the fate of the PRSP. This,
however, does not only collide with foreign policy and economic interests which are the
real driving forces of development assistance, humanitarian rhetoric notwithstanding. It
also affects the concerted resistance of the governmental as well as non-governmental aid
lobby which in other circumstances are all too eager to criticise a development policy by
remote control.
205 This is also valid for the “co-financing of the PRSC – budgetary financing for implementing the Tanza-
nian poverty reduction strategy” together with the World Bank and ten other donors. In addition there
is, among others, the “basket financing” in the health sector together with six other donors. Cf. BMZ,
Harmonisierung von Geberpraktiken in der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Afrika südlich der Sa-
hara, www.bmz.de (accessed 2003-05-23).
206 BMZ, Kurzfassung der Evaluierung “Deutsche Beteiligung am PRS-Prozess und an programmorientierter EZ
– Teilstudie Tansania, in: www.bmz.de (accessed 2003-05-22).
207 The United Republic of Tanzania. PRSP..., op. cit. (note 135), pp. 4, 19.
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Appendix
Bolivia and Tanzania in comparison – Basic Data
Indicator Bolivia
Latin America
& Caribbean Tanzania
Sub-Saha-
ra-Africa
Population
in millions, 2001A 8.5 523.6 34.4 673.9
Gross domestic product
in billions of current US-$, 2001A 8.0 2,000 9.3 315.7
Gross national product per head
Atlas method, in current US-$, 2001A 950 3,580 270 460
Foreign debt, Net Present Value
in % of exports, 2001D 131 n/a 143 n/a
Foreign debt service, NPV
in % of exports, 2001D 17 n/a 8 n/a
Official Development Aid per head
in current US-$, 2001A 85.6 11.4 35.8 20.7
Poverty rates:
Population below 1 US-$/day,
in %, 1999B 14.4 12.1 19.91 48.1
Population below 2 US-$/day,
in %, 1999C 34.3 n/a 59.73 n/a
Pop. Below the “minimum level of dietary
energy consumption”, in %, 1999B 22.0 12.0 46.0 33.0
Life expectancy
in years, 2001A 63.1 70.6 43.7 46.2
Child mortality
per 1000 births, 2001A 60.0 27.9 104.0 105.4
Illiteracy
in % of fifteen year-olds and older, 2001A 14.0 10.8 24.0 37.7
Human Development Index (HDI)
Rank / Value, 2000 E, 4
114 /
0.653 -- / 0.767
151 /
0.440 -- / 0.471
Sources:
A: World Bank, World Development Indicators database, April 2003, http://devdata.worldbank.org
(accessed 2003-06-24);
B: World Bank, Millennium Development Goals, data from April 2002, www.developmentgoals.org/Data.htm
(accessed 2003-06-24);
C: World Bank, Data by Topic: Poverty, www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/poverty.html;
D: IMF, IDA, The Enhanced HIPC Initiative and the Achievement of Long-Term External Debt Sustainability,
15.4. 2002, www.worldbank.org (accessed 2003-06-24), p. 35ff;
E: UNDP, Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. Human Development Report 2002, www.undp.prg
(accessed 2003-06-26).
Notes:
n/a: no announced; 1: Data for 1995; 2: Data for 1994; 3: Data for 1993; 4: The HDI 2000 ranges
from Norway (Rank 1, Value: 0.942) to Sierra Leone (Rank 173, Value: 0.275).
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Abbreviations
GDP: Gross domestic product
BMZ: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
(Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development)
CAS: Country Assistance Strategies of the World Bank
CDF: Comprehensive Development Framework
DAC: Development Assistance Committee, development committee of the
OECD
ESAF: Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, former IMF loan facility
EURODAD: European Network on Debt and Development
HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIPC II: Enhanced HIPC-Debt Initiative
IDA: International Development Association, organisation of the World Bank
Group
IFI: International Financial Institutions, here: IMF and World Bank
I-PRSP: Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IMF: International Monetary Fund
ND: National Dialogue (Diálogo Nacional) 2000 in Bolivia
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA: Official Development Assistance
ODI: Overseas Development Institute
PPA: Participatory Poverty Assessment
PRGF: Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, IMF loan facility
PRS: Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSC: Poverty Reduction Support Credit, World Bank credit line
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAP: Structural Adjustment Program(s)
SAPRI: Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative
TCDD: Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
